The clean way to test each option here is to recall the one defining feature that separates monism from dualism: monism regards international law and domestic law as a single, unified legal order, while dualism regards them as two separate orders that need a bridge, domestic legislation, before international law can operate at home.
The correct answer is Monism postulates the homogeneousness of international law and domestic law.
The fact pattern gives one clear diagnostic to work with: did the country need to pass domestic legislation before the treaty could take effect at home? 'X' did, in 1996; 'Y' never did. Under the passage's definitions, needing that translating step is dualism, and not needing it, because ratification alone brings the treaty into domestic effect, is monism.
The correct answer is 'X' is a dualist State and 'Y' is a monist State.
Being a dualist state is the operative fact here: for 'D', a ratified treaty like TRIPS produces no automatic domestic legal effect. Before its provisions can be enforced or complied with internally, they must be carried into domestic law through legislation, and that legislation can take the form of either amending an existing statute or enacting an altogether new one.
The correct answer is 'D' must incorporate the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement into an existing domestic legislation or in a new domestic legislation.
A quick way to check each statement here is to ask which theory the passage actually assigns automatic incorporation and subordination of domestic law to. The passage assigns both of these features to monism, and it assigns the opposite, no automatic incorporation and no subordination, to dualism.
The correct answer is According to dualism, ratified international conventions automatically become a part of domestic law and domestic law is subordinate to international law.
The convention here creates an obligation to legislate, not a ready-made, self-contained offence: it tells states to define and punish bribery but supplies no definition and no penalty of its own. That gap matters more than whether 'X' is monist or dualist, because neither theory can conjure a punishable offence out of a treaty clause that itself has no defined content.
The correct answer is Mr. A cannot be punished for committing an offence under the Convention irrespective of whether 'X' is a monist or a dualist State.