List of top Legal Studies Questions asked in CLAT

Same-sex marriage has no legal recognition in India as per the recent Supreme Court's judgment, where it was decided that this is an issue for Parliament to address. While Hindu marriages between transgender persons and cisgender men are permissible, and the Court acknowledged systemic discrimination and the right to choose a partner, it held that there is no fundamental right to marry. The government has been urged to form a panel to consider granting more legal rights to same-sex couples, but the legal status of marriage remains unchanged for now. The five-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India in Supriya Chakraborty & Anr. v. Union of India (2023), in a majority verdict, ruled that there is no fundamental right to marry under the Indian Constitution, making it beyond the court's scope to legislate on same-sex marriage.
The Court stated that the power to legislate on same-sex marriage rests with the Parliament and state legislatures. The judgment affirmed constitutional rights for LGBTQ+ citizens and the right to choose a partner. The government agreed to set up a panel to explore legal rights and benefits for same-sex couples, though these benefits are not the same as those conferred by marriage. Same-sex couples cannot legally marry and do not receive the same legal rights, such as automatic inheritance, pension, or adoption rights, that legally married couples do. Despite the ruling, LGBTQ+ couples continue to face legal discrimination and have no social recognition of marriage. The Court affirmed the right of same-sex couples to cohabit privately. While the Supreme Court's verdict brought limited benefits and acknowledgments, it has not legalized same-sex marriage in India, deferring the ultimate decision to the Parliament. (279 words)
[Extracted, with edits and revisions, from "The Hindu", dated 27th October 2023]
The recent Supreme Court judgment in State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu (2025) affirmed that a Governor cannot exercise an absolute or “pocket” veto on bills, holding that if assent is withheld, the bill must be returned to the legislature “as soon as possible” for reconsideration, with the Governor having no discretion to withhold assent again. The court established that inaction or indefinite delay is illegal and unconstitutional, prescribing timelines for the Governor’s decision and even “deeming assent” on pending bills in the Tamil Nadu case, establishing a critical precedent for judicial review of gubernatorial powers.
The Supreme Court explicitly rejected the Governor’s power to an absolute or “pocket” veto, which allows for bills to be indefinitely delayed. If a Governor withholds assent to a bill, they are constitutionally obligated to return it to the State Assembly for reconsideration, according to the proviso in Article 200 of the Constitution. If the State Assembly re-enacts a bill after it has been returned by the Governor, the Governor has no choice but to give assent to it and cannot withhold it for a second time.
The Court held that indefinitely delaying or remaining silent on bills is unconstitutional and that Governors must act “as soon as possible” on bills. The judgment expanded the scope of judicial review by setting timelines for the Governor’s actions on bills, allowing state governments to approach courts if these timelines are breached. In the case of Tamil Nadu, the Court used its powers under Article 142 to “deem assent” on the long-pending bills, which had the effect of making any subsequent decision by the President on those bills void. (276 words)
[Extracted with edits & revisions from The Hindu, dated 8th April 2025]
Good governance is only in the hands of good men. No doubt, what is good or bad is not for the court to decide; but the court can always indicate the constitutional ethos on goodness, good governance and purity in administration, remind the constitutional functionaries to preserve, protect and promote the same. That ethos are the unwritten words in our Constitution. However, as the Constitution makers stated, there is a presumption that the Prime Minister/Chief Minister would be well advised and guided by such unwritten yet constitutional principles as well. According to Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, such things were only to be left to the good sense of the Prime Minister, and for that matter, the Chief Minister of State, since it was expected that the two great constitutional functionaries would not dare to do any infamous thing by inducting an otherwise unfit person to the Council of Ministers. It appears, over a period of time, at least in some cases, it was only a story of great expectations. Some of the instances pointed out in the writ petition indicate that Dr. Ambedkar and other great visionaries in the Constituent Assembly have been bailed out. Qualification has been wrongly understood as the mere absence of prescribed disqualification. Hence, it has become the bounden duty of the court to remind the Prime Minister and the Chief Minister of the State of their duty to act in accordance with the constitutional aspirations.
No doubt, it is not for the court to issue any direction to the Prime Minister or the Chief Minister, as the case may be, as to the manner in which they should exercise their power while selecting the colleagues in the Council of Ministers. That is the constitutional prerogative of those functionaries who are called upon to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution. But it is the prophetic duty of this Court to remind the key duty holders about their role in working the Constitution. Hence, I am of the firm view, that the Prime Minister and the Chief Minister of the State, who themselves have taken oath to bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India and to discharge their duties faithfully and conscientiously, will be well advised to consider avoiding any person in the Council of Ministers, against whom charges have been framed by a criminal court in respect of offences involving moral turpitude and also offences specifically referred to in Chapter III of The Representation of the People Act, 1951. (416 words)
[Extract from the Supreme Court Judgement Manoj Narula v. Union of India]

I may here trace the history of the shaping of the Preamble because this would show that the Preamble was in conformity with the Constitution as it was finally accepted. Not only was the Constitution framed in the light of the Preamble but the Preamble was ultimately settled in the light of the Constitution. In the earliest draft the Preamble was something formal and read: "We, the people of India, seeking to promote the common good, do hereby, through our chosen representatives, enact, adopt and give to ourselves this Constitution." After the plan of June 3, 1947, which led to the decision to partition the country and to set up two independent Dominions of India and Pakistan, on June 8, 1947, a joint sub-committee of the Union Constitution and Provincial Constitution Committees, took note that the objective resolution would require amendment in view of the latest announcement of the British Government. The announcement of June 3 had made it clear that full independence, in the form of Dominion Status, would be conferred on India as from August 15, 1947. After examining the implications of partition the sub-committee thought that the question of making changes in the Objectives Resolution could appropriately be considered only when effect had actually been given to the June 3 Plan. Later on July 12, 1947, the special sub-committee again postponed consideration of the matter. The Union Constitution Committee provisionally accepted the Preamble as drafted by B.N. Rao and reproduced it in its report of July 4, 1947 without any change, with the tacit recognition at that stage that the Preamble would be finally based on the Objectives Resolution. In a statement circulated to members of the Assembly on July 18, 1947 Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru inter alia, observed that the Preamble was covered more or less by the Objectives Resolution which it was intended to incorporate in the final Constitution, subject to some modification on account of the political changes resulting from partition. (327 words) [Extracted with edits and revision from B Shiva Rao's - Framing of India's Constitution]

One of the central motifs of the past decade of governance under Indian Prime Minister has been the embrace of policy measures that seek to apply uniform solutions to disparate policy dilemmas facing the country. These measures, often termed One Nation policies, are motivated by a desire to replace the existing patchwork of state-specific policies, regulations, and regimes with measures that are identical across the length and breadth of India.
There are numerous examples of such One Nation policies being propagated and, in several cases, implemented in the eleven years since this Government came to power. For instance, in 2016, Parliament passed a series of constitutional amendments to introduce a new Goods and Services Tax (GST), which introduced a unified value-added tax in place of state-specific levies. This reform, known informally as One Nation, One Tax, had been debated and discussed for nearly two decades and was widely touted as an important precursor to forging a common market across India’s twenty-eight states.
In a similar vein, the government rolled out a new initiative to allow Indian citizens to take advantage of subsidized food rations irrespective of their state of residence. This scheme, commonly termed One Nation, One Ration Card, was intended to increase access to welfare benefits, especially for the millions of internal migrants in India without a fixed place of residence.
Earlier this year, the government announced the launch of a new online portal that will provide students, faculty, and researchers across the country’s public higher education institutions with open access to international scholarly journals and articles under a scheme it has dubbed One Nation, One Subscription.
Most notably, the government recently signalled its intention to pursue a monumental One Nation policy that has been long discussed but only recently outlined in detail. This measure, known as One Nation, One Election, would do away with India’s current system of staggered elections for state and national assemblies, replacing it with a framework of simultaneous elections. The proposal, which has featured in many of PM’s speeches in the past, was advanced by a high-level committee (HLC) established by the government in 2023. (351 words)

Assume that the statements in the passages are the applicable law.
Quashing a case of cruelty that was filed against a man by his wife, the Bombay High Court said that if a married lady is asked to do household work for the family, it cannot be said that she is treated “like a maid servant”. The Court was hearing an application by the husband and his parents seeking that proceedings against them are quashed. A First Information Report (“FIR”) was filed against the trio in September 2020, around nine months after the marriage, alleging that they hounded the woman for money to purchase a car, harassed her mentally and physically and treated her like a maid servant. Examining the evidence, the Court found that there was no merit to the woman’s allegations. The Court said that though the FIR says that she was treated properly for about a month and then “like a maid servant”, there are no details of what this meant. The Court added: “If a married lady is asked to do household work for the purpose of the family, it cannot be said that it is like a maid servant.” The Court held that the mere use of the word harassment “mentally and physically” in the FIR is not sufficient to constitute an offence Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (“IPC”), which punishes the husband, or a relative of the husband of a woman who subjects her to cruelty in any way. It is interesting to note that Section 498A of the IPC also provides that if a married woman is actually treated like a ‘maid servant’, it would be an offence under that Section.
[Extracted, with edits and revisions, from “If Wife Is Asked To Do Household Work, Does Not Mean She Is Treated Like Maid: Bombay HC”, The Wire]
When parties to a contract are under a 'mistake' regarding an important fact related to such contract, it may affect the contract in two ways. It may, firstly, defeat the consent altogether that the parties are supposed to have given, that is to say, the consent is unreal. Two or more persons are said to consent when they agree upon the same thing in the same sense. Secondly, the mistake may mislead the parties as to the purpose which they had contemplated. Where the mistake does not defeat consent, but only misleads the parties, i.e., where both parties to an agreement are under a mistake as to a matter of fact essential to the agreement, the agreement is void. However, if the mistake is concerning an erroneous opinion regarding value of the subject-matter of the agreement, it is not a mistake as to a matter of fact. Thus, agreement is void when: (1) both the parties to an agreement are mistaken, (2) their mistake is as to a matter of fact, and (3) the fact about which they are mistaken is essential to the agreement. Further, it is pertinent to note that a mistake, in order to invalidate a contract, should be a mistake of fact and not a mistake of law. Furthermore, where only one party to the contract is under mistake of fact, and the other party is not, the contract is not voidable merely for such reason.
The United Nations Commission on Environment and Development defines 'sustainable development' as follows: "Sustainable development is the development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." Sustainable development clearly postulates an anthropocentric bias, least concerned with the rights of other species which live on this earth. Anthropocentrism is always human-interest focused thinking that considers non-humans as having only instrumental value to humans, in other words, humans take precedence and human responsibilities towards non-human are based on benefits to humans. Eco-centrism is nature-centred, where humans are part of nature and non-humans have intrinsic value. In other words, human interest does not take automatic precedence and humans have obligations towards non-humans independently of human interest. Eco-centrism is, therefore, life-centred, nature-centred where nature includes both humans and non-humans. The Constitution of India protects not only human rights but also casts an obligation on human beings to protect and preserve a specie from becoming extinct. Conservation and protection of environment is an inseparable part of the fundamental right to life. According to the doctrine of 'public trust' recognized under the Constitution of India, certain common properties such as rivers, seashores, forests and the air are held by the Government in trusteeship for the free and unimpeded use of the general public. The resources like air, sea, waters and the forests have such a great importance to the people as a whole, that it would be totally unjustified to make them a subject of private ownership. The State, as a custodian of the natural resources, has a duty to maintain them not merely for the benefit of the public, but for the best interest of flora and fauna, wildlife and so on.
There are two principal theories on the relationship between international law and domestic law-Monism and Dualism. The monistic theory maintains that the subjects of two systems of law, i.e., international law and municipal law are essentially one. The monistic theory asserts that international law and municipal law are fundamentally the same in nature, and arise from the same science of law, and are manifestations of a single conception of law. The followers of this theory view international law and municipal law as part of a universal body of legal rules binding all human beings, collectively or singly. In a monist system, international law does not need to be incorporated into domestic law because international law immediately becomes incorporated in domestic legal system upon ratification of an international treaty. According to this theory, domestic law is subordinate to international law. The Statute of the International Criminal Court, therefore, can be directly applied and adjudicated in national courts according to the monistic theory. According to dualism theory, international law and municipal law represent two entirely distinct legal systems, i.e., international has an intrinsically different character from that of municipal law. International law is not directly applicable in the domestic system under dualism. First, international law must be translated into State legislation before the domestic courts can apply it. For example, under dualism, ratification of the Statute of the International Criminal Court is not enough-it must be implemented through State legislation into the domestic system. Most states and courts presumptively view national and international legal systems as discrete entities and routinely discuss in dualist fashion incorporation of rules from one system to the other.
A special marriage, i.e., a marriage between persons from two different religious affiliations can be legally contracted in India under the provisions of the law relating to special marriages. The law relating to special marriages provides for the registration of such marriages and for divorce in such cases. One of the modes in which a special marriage can be legally terminated is through divorce by mutual consent of parties to the marriage. In order to obtain a divorce by mutual consent, both the parties to the special marriage are required to jointly present a petition for divorce to the district court on the ground that they have been living separately for one year or more, that they have not been able to live together and that they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved. At least six months after the presentation of such petition, but not later than eighteen months after the presentation of such petition, the district court, after hearing the parties and after making the necessary inquiry, and being satisfied that the marriage is a 'special marriage', and that the claims made in the petition are true, shall declare the marriage to be dissolved. Further, the personal presence of the parties before the district court at the time of presenting the joint petition for divorce is not mandatory, as the parties can satisfy the court even by affidavit that the requirements for granting divorce on mutual consent are fulfilled.
The Constitution of India guarantees to all its citizens certain fundamental freedoms, which are recognized as their fundamental rights. However, these fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution of India are not absolute as no right can be. Each of these fundamental rights is liable to be controlled, curtailed and regulated to some extent by laws made by the Parliament or the State Legislatures. Accordingly, the Constitution of India lays down the grounds and the purposes for which a legislature can impose 'reasonable restrictions' on the rights guaranteed to citizens. The State cannot travel beyond the contours of these reasonable restrictions in curbing the fundamental rights guaranteed to citizens. While determining the constitutional validity of a restriction imposed on a fundamental right by a legislation, the Court is not concerned with the necessity of the restriction or the wisdom of the policy underlying it, but only whether the restriction is in excess of the requirement, and whether the legislature has overstepped the Constitutional limitations. Two of the fundamental rights guaranteed to every citizen of India are- the right to move freely throughout the territory of India and the right to reside and settle in any part of India. However, the State may impose reasonable restrictions on these rights by law, in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribes.
To maintain the secular character of the Indian polity, not only does the Constitution of India guarantee freedom of religion to individuals and groups, but it is also against the general policy of the Constitution of India that any money be paid out of the public funds for promoting or maintaining any particular religion. Accordingly, it is provided in the Constitution of India that no person shall be compelled to pay any taxes, the proceeds of which are specifically appropriated in payment of expenses for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination. This does not prohibit the State from enacting a law to incur expenses for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination, but by such law, no person can be compelled to pay any tax, the proceeds of which are to be so utilized. This, however, does not invalidate levy of a fee to provide some service. Thus, a fee can be levied on pilgrims to a religious fair to meet the expenses of the measures taken to safeguard the health, safety and welfare of the pilgrims. Such fee levied by a State will be valid because the object of such contribution is not to foster or preserve religion, but to control secular administration of religious institutions.
Writ is a public law remedy. It refers to a formal. written order issued by a judicial authority directing an individual or authority to do or refrain from doing an act. The High Court. while exercising its power of judicial review, does not act as an appellate body. It is concerned with illegality. irrationality and procedural impropriety of an order passed by the State or a Statutory Authority. A High Court is empowered to issue directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights and for any other purpose. The writ jurisdiction of High Court is discretionary and equitable. Writ of mandamus is issued by a court commanding a public authority to perform a public duty belonging to its office. It can be issued only when a legal duty is imposed on the authority and the petitioner has right to compel the performance of such duty. Writ of mandamus is requested to be issued, inter alia. to compel performance of public duties which may be administrative, ministerial or statutory in nature. A writ of mandamus may be issued in favour of a person who establishes a legal right in himself. It may be issued against a person who has a mandatory legal duty to perform. but has failed or has neglected to do so. Such a legal duty emanates by operation of law. The writ of mandamus is most extensive in regards to its remedial nature. The object of mandamus is to prevent disorder emanating from failure of justice and is required to be granted in all cases where law has established no specific remedy.
Principle: Master is liable for the acts of his servant done in the course of his duties.
Facts: X hired an employee Y in his construction business. Y was the property in-charge who received construction material and gave receipts for the material received by him. Z claimed payment for cement supplied to X which was duly received by Y. X denied the payment on the ground that he has only received half of the material and the balance was misutilized by the employee Y.
Principle: Employer is liable for the injury caused to the employee in the course of his employment.
Facts: X organized a party and hired a caterer. During the party, the generator set went out of order and he requested one employee of caterer i.e. Y to bring the mechanic on his vehicle and promised to pay 1000 for the same to Y. Y met with an accident while going to fetch the mechanic and he seeks compensation.
Principle: Terms of any written contract can be proved by producing the written contract only and oral evidence is excluded.
Facts: A gives B receipt for money paid by B. Oral evidence is offered to prove payment.
Principle: Oral evidence must always be direct i.e. of the person who says he saw the event and hearsay evidence is no evidence.
Facts: X was told by Y (whom X trusts) that Z has murdered A.
Principle: A spouse is not permitted to put in evidence in any court, any communication during marriage between the spouses without the consent of the person who made the communication.
Facts: X, who is the wife of Y, saw her husband (Y) coming out of the neighbour's house at 6:00 am in the morning. Y told his wife X that he has murdered the neighbour and handed over the jewellery of that neighbour to his wife.
Principle: Inducing any animal to move or to change its motion and thereby intentionally causing fear of injury or annoyance to others by such act, is an offence of use of criminal force.
Facts: X incites his dog to chase and run after his neighbour Y, to teach Y to stay away from him. The act is done without neighbour's consent and against his will.
Principle: Use of criminal force intentionally knowing that it would cause or is likely to cause injury or annoyance to the person against whom force is used, is an offence.
Facts: X, a renowned social worker who had launched a movement for the liberation of women, pulls up a Muslim women’s veil in public in good faith without her consent, causing annoyance to her.
Principle: Killing is not murder, if it is committed in a sudden fight without pre-meditation in a heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel.
Facts: X and Y were buying liquor from a liquor shop at 7 pm. Y abused X and there was quarrel between them. X told Y that he will not spare him and Y shouted that his house is adjoining the shop only and if X had the guts, he can come anytime. X went back to his shop which was nearby, procured a knife and went to Y's residence at 9 pm and stabbed him to death.
Principle: Whoever causes death by rash or negligent act commits an offence.
Facts: X is having a house on the roadside which is also having a street on the back of the house. He has a lawn on the back of his house where he has built a toilet. To prevent the intruders from entering his house, he got the fence charged with a high voltage live electric wire. Z was passing through the street at the backyard of the house of X and sat down to take rest near the fence. While getting up, his hands came in contact with the fence which was connected to high voltage electric wire causing his death.
Principle: Death caused by rash or negligent act of a person is an offence.
Facts: X was driving his SUV car in a lonely road leading to a forest at 160 km per hour. Suddenly, someone appears from the forest on the road and in the resultant accident, the car hits the commuter causing his death.
Principle: Doing of an act which causes common injury, danger or annoyance to public or which is likely to cause such injury or annoyance is Public nuisance. A common nuisance is not excused because it causes some nuisance or advantage.
Facts: ‘A’ a farmer having large farmlands burns crop residue (stubble) on his fields after harvesting the crop to make the field ready for next crop as this is the easy, fast and convenient method of making the field ready for next crop. His farmlands are adjoining a densely inhabited residential area and people pass through the smoke while travelling on the road adjoining his farmlands. The smoke caused by fire also enters the houses in the colony.
Principle: Anyone who induces or attempts to induce a voter to vote in a particular manner on the ground that the voter will face divine displeasure, shall be guilty of offence of interfering with free exercise of right to vote.
Facts: During election campaign period one candidate X told the voters that if they do not vote for her, voters will be cursed because the election candidate is the God’s own child and those who do not vote for her, they will not be liked by God.