The goal is to find the lowest percentage of students likely to vote. Let's examine each situation:
1. Both campaign on issues:
The voting percentage is calculated as: 20 × (Amiya's campaign level + Ramya's campaign level).
The lowest campaign level for both is 1 (staid). So, the voting percentage is: 20 × (1 + 1) = 40%.
2. Amiya attacks, Ramya campaigns on issues:
Starting from the base 40% (calculated above), adjustments are made. 10% of Amiya's potential votes (half of 40%) shift to Ramya, and another 10% of Amiya's potential votes become disengaged. Therefore, the final voting percentage is 40% - (0.1 × 20%) = 38%.
3. Ramya attacks, Amiya campaigns on issues:
This scenario is the reverse of the previous one. Starting with 40%, adjustments are: 20% of Ramya's potential votes (half of 40%) go to Amiya, and 5% of Ramya's potential votes become disengaged. Thus, the voting percentage is 40% - (0.05 × 20%) = 39%.
4. Both attack:
Starting with 40% potential votes, 10% of students become disengaged and do not vote. The voting percentage is calculated as: 40% × (1 - 0.1) = 36%.
Comparing all scenarios, the minimum percentage of students who will vote is 36%.
To find the minimum percentage of votes Ramya is guaranteed when attacking Amiya, we examine a specific scenario: Ramya attacks, and Amiya focuses on issues. The calculation proceeds as follows:
1. Initial State: Both candidates campaign by focusing on issues at a vigorous level (Level 2).Nbsp;
Nbsp;
a. Combined campaign level: \(2+2=4\)
b. Total voting percentage: \(20 \times 4 = 80\%\)
c. Ramya's initial vote share: \(\frac{2}{4} \times 80\% = 40\%\)
2. Ramya Switches Strategy: Ramya attacks Amiya, while Amiya continues to focus on issues.Nbsp;
a. Votes lost by Ramya to Amiya: 20% of Ramya's initial votes (40%) switch to Amiya, equating to \(0.2 \times 40\% = 8\%\).
b. Voters lost by Ramya to abstention: 5% of Ramya's initial votes (40%) will not vote, equating to \(0.05 \times 40\% = 2\%\).
c. Ramya's adjusted vote percentage: \(40\% - 8\% - 2\% = 30\%\)
3. Worst-Case Scenario: Both candidates attack each other.Nbsp;
a. Voting percentage with mutual attacks: \(90\% \times 80 = 72\%\)
b. Ramya's vote share in this scenario: \(\frac{40\%}{80\%} \times 72\% = 36\%\)
Considering all scenarios, Ramya's vote percentages are 30%, 15%, and 36%. Therefore, the minimum guaranteed percentage for Ramya when she attacks is 15%.
To find the largest possible voting margin for a candidate's win, let's examine the outcomes based on the described campaign strategies:
Let's break down the scenarios to determine the maximum possible margin:
The maximum possible margin is achieved when Ramya attacks and Amiya focuses on issues (Amiya vigorous, Ramya staid), resulting in a 29% margin for Amiya.
Therefore, the maximum voting margin is 29%.
The plots below depict and compare the average monthly incomes (in Rs. ’000) of males and females in ten cities of India in the years 2005 and 2015. The ten cities, marked A-J in the records, are of different population sizes. For a fair comparison, to adjust for inflation, incomes for both the periods are scaled to 2025 prices. Each red dot represents the average monthly income of females in a particular city in a particular year, while each blue dot represents the average monthly income of males in a particular city in a particular year. The gender gap for a city, for a particular year, is defined as the absolute value of the average monthly income of males, minus the average monthly income of females, in that year.