The paradox of patrimony laws, as described, stems from the discrepancy between their objective and their effect. These regulations were established to preserve a nation's cultural legacy by prohibiting the removal and foreign possession of artifacts. Nevertheless, the text points out that these safeguards have resulted in an unforeseen reduction in archaeological investigation, particularly by international entities.
Because these laws impede external organizations from keeping or exhibiting unearthed artifacts, they dissuade financial contributions and involvement in excavations. Consequently, fewer new sites are uncovered, counteracting the primary aim of safeguarding and comprehending cultural history.
The core paradox: The laws intended to protect cultural assets, but in doing so, they diminished new archaeological findings.
The passage highlights that archaeological sites benefit source countries through cultural, historical, economic, and societal advantages. It suggests that countries should adapt strict cultural property laws to "reap the benefits of new archaeological discoveries, which typically increase tourism and enhance cultural pride."
This demonstrates that archaeological sites are perceived as drivers of tourism and national pride. Consequently, it can be deduced that some source countries value these sites for their positive impact on the tourism industry.
Inference: Some source countries consider archaeological sites important due to their contribution to the tourism sector.
Option A: The author recognizes that stringent cultural property laws can discourage foreign investment in archaeological expeditions. Consequently, the author would logically endorse initiatives aimed at encouraging international organizations to continue financing such research in host nations.
Option B: The text cites China's successful shift from strict regulations to international cooperation, which led to an increase in archaeological discoveries. Therefore, this is a justifiable and substantiated recommendation.
Option C: The passage advocates for international archaeological cooperation and suggests that permitting foreign examination and display of artifacts can be advantageous. This sentiment aligns with the author's reservations regarding the restrictive aspects of cultural property regulations.
Option D: While the passage champions international collaboration, it does not advocate for outsourcing research to foreign countries (i.e., conducting research entirely outside the country of origin). Instead, the author promotes collaborative efforts within the country where the research originates. Therefore, Option D contradicts the author's probable recommendations.
The correct answer is: Option D — it is not a suggestion the author would likely support.
The argument posits that stringent regulations for safeguarding cultural artifacts, despite good intentions and broad endorsement, could diminish international bodies' inclination to finance overseas archaeological investigations. Such a reduction in funding may subsequently have adverse consequences on discoveries, tourism, and national self-esteem within the originating nations.
Option D contests this rationale by proposing that external financial backing persists irrespective of these regulations, thus severing the presumed connection between regulation and diminished funding. If this premise holds, it suggests that the scarcity of archaeological findings could stem from unaccounted external influences beyond the author's purview.
Consequently, the accurate response is: Option D — it offers an alternative rationale that contradicts the passage's central assertion.
You may laugh at a hat, but what you are making fun of, in this case, is not the piece of felt or straw, but the shape that men have given it, -- the human caprice whose mould it has assumed. It is strange that so important a fact, and such a simple one too, has not attracted to a greater degree the attention of philosophers. Several have de ned man as "an animal which laughs." They might equally well have de ned him as an animal which is laughed at; for if any other animal, or some lifeless object, produces the same effect, it is always because of some resemblance to man, of the stamp he gives it or the use he puts it to.
Here I would point out, as a symptom equally worthy of notice, the ABSENCE OF FEELING which usually accompanies laughter. It seems as though the comic could not produce its disturbing effect unless it fell, so to say, on the surface of a soul that is thoroughly calm and unru ed. Indifference is its natural environment, for laughter has no greater foe than emotion. I do not mean that we could not laugh at a person who inspires us with pity, for instance, or evenwith affection, but in such a case we must, for the moment, put our affection out of court and impose silence upon our pity. In a society composed of pure intelligences there would probably be no more tears, though perhaps there would still be laughter; whereas highly emotional souls, in tune and unison with life, in whom every event would be sentimentally prolonged and re-echoed, would neither know nor understand laughter. Try, for a moment, to become interested in everything that is being said and done; act, in imagination, with those who act, and feel with those who feel; in a word, give your sympathy its widest expansion: as though at the touch of a fairy wand you will see the imsiest of objects assume importance, and a gloomy hue spread over everything. Now step aside, look upon life as a disinterested spectator: many a drama will turn into a comedy. It is enough for us to stop our ears to the sound of music, in a room where dancing is going on, for the dancers at once to appear ridiculous. How many human actions would stand a similar test? Should we not see many of them suddenly pass from grave to gay, on isolating them from the accompanying music of sentiment? To produce the whole of its effect, then, the comic demands something like a momentary anesthesia of the heart. Its appeal is to intelligence, pure and simple
This uidity and situational dependence is uniquely human. In other species, in-group/outgroup distinctions re ect degrees of biological relatedness, or what evolutionary biologists call “kin selection.” Rodents distinguish between a sibling, a cousin, and a stranger by smell—xed, genetically determined pheromonal signatures—and adapt their cooperation accordingly. Those murderous groups of chimps are largely made up of brothers or cousins who grew up together and predominantly harm outsiders. Humans are plenty capable of kin-selective violence themselves, yet human group mentality is often utterly independent of such instinctual familial bonds. Most modern human societies rely instead on cultural kin selection, a process allowing people to feel closely related to what are, in a biological sense, total strangers. Often, this requires a highly active process of inculcation, with its attendant rituals and vocabularies. Consider military drills producing “bands of brothers,” unrelated college freshmen becoming sorority “sisters,” or the bygone value of welcoming immigrants into “the American family.” This malleable, rather than genetically xed, path of identity formation also drives people to adopt arbitrary markers that enable them to spot their cultural kin in an ocean of strangers—hence the importance various communities attach to ags, dress, or facial hair. The hipster beard, the turban, and the “Make America Great Again” hat all fulfill this role by sending strong signals of tribal belonging. Moreover, these cultural communities are arbitrary when compared to the relatively axed logic of biological kin selection. Few things show this arbitrariness better than the experience of immigrant families, where the randomness of a visa lottery can radically reshu e a child’s education, career opportunities, and cultural predilections. Had my grandparents and father missed the train out of Moscow that they instead barely made, maybe I’d be a chain smoking Russian academic rather than a Birkenstock-wearing American one, moved to tears by the heroism during the Battle of Stalingrad rather than that at Pearl Harbor. Scaled up from the level of individual family histories, our big-picture group identities—the national identities and cultural principles that structure our lives— are just as arbitrary and subject to the vagaries of history.