The paradoxical nature of "thrifting," as presented, stems from its unforeseen detrimental environmental consequences. The text describes the Second Hand September initiative, which advocates for second-hand purchasing as environmentally sound, contrasting it with fast fashion's energy consumption, which surpasses that of air travel.
While thrifting endeavors to mitigate textile waste and its associated ecological damage, it inadvertently generates environmental problems due to microfibers released from older garments, thereby polluting water bodies.
Consequently, the irony lies in this supposedly sustainable practice contributing to environmental degradation, which corresponds to the conclusion: environmental issues have been generated.
To address the question, we must determine why companies like ThredUP have not succeeded in the UK, excluding one incorrect option. The provided text analyzes UK consumer habits and business approaches concerning pre-owned apparel.
The passage outlines the following potential reasons:
The provided options are:
Evaluating these points against the passage reveals that the assertion "the British don’t buy second-hand clothing" lacks substantiation. The text acknowledges a preference for new items while also noting an increasing adoption of second-hand shopping, implying that Britons do indeed buy pre-owned apparel.
Therefore, the correct answer is: the British don’t buy second-hand clothing.
The text advocates for sustainable shopping, especially second-hand purchasing, to lessen fashion's environmental damage. It stresses consumer awareness of clothing's environmental effects and recommends choosing durable items that shed fewer microfibers.
While acknowledging microfiber pollution from second-hand clothing, the text posits this could be resolved if these items were consistently high-quality. Consumers buying durable, low-shedding items address both microfiber pollution and landfill waste. Thus, Option C is correct.
Option A focuses on the buying process, not clothing attributes, and doesn't contradict the main point.
Option B could support sustainability and the main idea, not undermine it.
Option D supports the main point by promoting reduced environmental harm via sustainable shopping.
Therefore, the correct option is (C): second-hand stores sold only high-quality clothes.
Option B is affirmed as correct. The text highlights the environmental detriments of fast fashion, specifically the issue of garment waste accumulating in landfills. It contrasts the disposable, rapid-cycle model of fast fashion with a recommended sustainable and durable methodology, identified as 'slow fashion'.
The passage suggests that acquiring robust, superior-quality apparel serves as a method to mitigate the negative environmental impacts stemming from the fashion sector. Therefore, 'slow fashion' is understood to represent clothing distinguished by its exceptional quality and extended lifespan, promoting a more sustainable and environmentally aware consumption pattern in fashion.
The correct option is thus (B): are of high quality and long lasting.
You may laugh at a hat, but what you are making fun of, in this case, is not the piece of felt or straw, but the shape that men have given it, -- the human caprice whose mould it has assumed. It is strange that so important a fact, and such a simple one too, has not attracted to a greater degree the attention of philosophers. Several have de ned man as "an animal which laughs." They might equally well have de ned him as an animal which is laughed at; for if any other animal, or some lifeless object, produces the same effect, it is always because of some resemblance to man, of the stamp he gives it or the use he puts it to.
Here I would point out, as a symptom equally worthy of notice, the ABSENCE OF FEELING which usually accompanies laughter. It seems as though the comic could not produce its disturbing effect unless it fell, so to say, on the surface of a soul that is thoroughly calm and unru ed. Indifference is its natural environment, for laughter has no greater foe than emotion. I do not mean that we could not laugh at a person who inspires us with pity, for instance, or evenwith affection, but in such a case we must, for the moment, put our affection out of court and impose silence upon our pity. In a society composed of pure intelligences there would probably be no more tears, though perhaps there would still be laughter; whereas highly emotional souls, in tune and unison with life, in whom every event would be sentimentally prolonged and re-echoed, would neither know nor understand laughter. Try, for a moment, to become interested in everything that is being said and done; act, in imagination, with those who act, and feel with those who feel; in a word, give your sympathy its widest expansion: as though at the touch of a fairy wand you will see the imsiest of objects assume importance, and a gloomy hue spread over everything. Now step aside, look upon life as a disinterested spectator: many a drama will turn into a comedy. It is enough for us to stop our ears to the sound of music, in a room where dancing is going on, for the dancers at once to appear ridiculous. How many human actions would stand a similar test? Should we not see many of them suddenly pass from grave to gay, on isolating them from the accompanying music of sentiment? To produce the whole of its effect, then, the comic demands something like a momentary anesthesia of the heart. Its appeal is to intelligence, pure and simple
This uidity and situational dependence is uniquely human. In other species, in-group/outgroup distinctions re ect degrees of biological relatedness, or what evolutionary biologists call “kin selection.” Rodents distinguish between a sibling, a cousin, and a stranger by smell—xed, genetically determined pheromonal signatures—and adapt their cooperation accordingly. Those murderous groups of chimps are largely made up of brothers or cousins who grew up together and predominantly harm outsiders. Humans are plenty capable of kin-selective violence themselves, yet human group mentality is often utterly independent of such instinctual familial bonds. Most modern human societies rely instead on cultural kin selection, a process allowing people to feel closely related to what are, in a biological sense, total strangers. Often, this requires a highly active process of inculcation, with its attendant rituals and vocabularies. Consider military drills producing “bands of brothers,” unrelated college freshmen becoming sorority “sisters,” or the bygone value of welcoming immigrants into “the American family.” This malleable, rather than genetically xed, path of identity formation also drives people to adopt arbitrary markers that enable them to spot their cultural kin in an ocean of strangers—hence the importance various communities attach to ags, dress, or facial hair. The hipster beard, the turban, and the “Make America Great Again” hat all fulfill this role by sending strong signals of tribal belonging. Moreover, these cultural communities are arbitrary when compared to the relatively axed logic of biological kin selection. Few things show this arbitrariness better than the experience of immigrant families, where the randomness of a visa lottery can radically reshu e a child’s education, career opportunities, and cultural predilections. Had my grandparents and father missed the train out of Moscow that they instead barely made, maybe I’d be a chain smoking Russian academic rather than a Birkenstock-wearing American one, moved to tears by the heroism during the Battle of Stalingrad rather than that at Pearl Harbor. Scaled up from the level of individual family histories, our big-picture group identities—the national identities and cultural principles that structure our lives— are just as arbitrary and subject to the vagaries of history.