The author cites ancient Greek philosophers to identify omissions in Steven Pinker's thesis on rationality. Pinker defines rationality as a cognitive and moral virtue, but the author contends he neglects the influence of moral and ethical education on rational conduct.
The author references figures such as Plato’s Socrates, who acknowledged the significance of dreams and visions alongside logic, to underscore that ethical and non-rational elements were fundamental to their conception of rationality—elements that Pinker largely disregards.
Consequently, the correct assertion is: Highlight deficiencies in Pinker's exploration of the role of ethical factors in rational behavior.
Steven Pinker's perspective on rationality emphasizes its significance in individual and public spheres. Although Pinker champions deliberate, step-by-step reasoning, the text notes that substantial accomplishments often originate from creative intuition or immediate understanding.
The discoveries of Kekulé (benzene structure) and Mozart (symphonies) serve as instances where profound ideas surface from intuitive leaps rather than rigid logical deduction.
Consequently, the accurate conclusion is: Major breakthroughs in diverse domains can originate from intuitive insights, not solely from the propulsion of logical thought.
The text highlights Pinker's focus on sequential reasoning and rational tools, indicating that proficiency in these areas improves decision-making in practical situations involving "uncertain and shifting information." The author supports Pinker's work by agreeing that logical reasoning "equips people with the ability to tackle challenging practical problems" [Option B].
Option A is incorrect; while the author concedes Pinker views rationality as a moral virtue, they observe Pinker inadequately explores moral and ethical education.Option C is too narrow, concentrating on a specific application of Pinker's ideas rather than the overall message.Option D similarly limits the scope to the general usefulness of rationality in decision-making.
Therefore, the correct option is (B): equips people with the ability to tackle challenging practical problems.
Option C is the choice that contradicts Pinker's viewpoint on rational thought, aligning with ancient Greek philosophers. The text indicates that while sequential reasoning is valuable, significant human advancements often stem from sudden insights or epiphanies, not exclusively from methodical, step-by-step processes.
Pinker and Plato's Socrates highlight that rational thinking entails acknowledging one's knowledge limitations (Option D) and formulating independent conclusions (Option A), rather than relying on the influence of others.
Furthermore, the text notes a moral and ethical component to rationality (Option B), a concept addressed by Pinker, albeit briefly.
Therefore, Option C is the correct answer, as it deviates from Pinker's defined method of rational thinking.
You may laugh at a hat, but what you are making fun of, in this case, is not the piece of felt or straw, but the shape that men have given it, -- the human caprice whose mould it has assumed. It is strange that so important a fact, and such a simple one too, has not attracted to a greater degree the attention of philosophers. Several have de ned man as "an animal which laughs." They might equally well have de ned him as an animal which is laughed at; for if any other animal, or some lifeless object, produces the same effect, it is always because of some resemblance to man, of the stamp he gives it or the use he puts it to.
Here I would point out, as a symptom equally worthy of notice, the ABSENCE OF FEELING which usually accompanies laughter. It seems as though the comic could not produce its disturbing effect unless it fell, so to say, on the surface of a soul that is thoroughly calm and unru ed. Indifference is its natural environment, for laughter has no greater foe than emotion. I do not mean that we could not laugh at a person who inspires us with pity, for instance, or evenwith affection, but in such a case we must, for the moment, put our affection out of court and impose silence upon our pity. In a society composed of pure intelligences there would probably be no more tears, though perhaps there would still be laughter; whereas highly emotional souls, in tune and unison with life, in whom every event would be sentimentally prolonged and re-echoed, would neither know nor understand laughter. Try, for a moment, to become interested in everything that is being said and done; act, in imagination, with those who act, and feel with those who feel; in a word, give your sympathy its widest expansion: as though at the touch of a fairy wand you will see the imsiest of objects assume importance, and a gloomy hue spread over everything. Now step aside, look upon life as a disinterested spectator: many a drama will turn into a comedy. It is enough for us to stop our ears to the sound of music, in a room where dancing is going on, for the dancers at once to appear ridiculous. How many human actions would stand a similar test? Should we not see many of them suddenly pass from grave to gay, on isolating them from the accompanying music of sentiment? To produce the whole of its effect, then, the comic demands something like a momentary anesthesia of the heart. Its appeal is to intelligence, pure and simple
This uidity and situational dependence is uniquely human. In other species, in-group/outgroup distinctions re ect degrees of biological relatedness, or what evolutionary biologists call “kin selection.” Rodents distinguish between a sibling, a cousin, and a stranger by smell—xed, genetically determined pheromonal signatures—and adapt their cooperation accordingly. Those murderous groups of chimps are largely made up of brothers or cousins who grew up together and predominantly harm outsiders. Humans are plenty capable of kin-selective violence themselves, yet human group mentality is often utterly independent of such instinctual familial bonds. Most modern human societies rely instead on cultural kin selection, a process allowing people to feel closely related to what are, in a biological sense, total strangers. Often, this requires a highly active process of inculcation, with its attendant rituals and vocabularies. Consider military drills producing “bands of brothers,” unrelated college freshmen becoming sorority “sisters,” or the bygone value of welcoming immigrants into “the American family.” This malleable, rather than genetically xed, path of identity formation also drives people to adopt arbitrary markers that enable them to spot their cultural kin in an ocean of strangers—hence the importance various communities attach to ags, dress, or facial hair. The hipster beard, the turban, and the “Make America Great Again” hat all fulfill this role by sending strong signals of tribal belonging. Moreover, these cultural communities are arbitrary when compared to the relatively axed logic of biological kin selection. Few things show this arbitrariness better than the experience of immigrant families, where the randomness of a visa lottery can radically reshu e a child’s education, career opportunities, and cultural predilections. Had my grandparents and father missed the train out of Moscow that they instead barely made, maybe I’d be a chain smoking Russian academic rather than a Birkenstock-wearing American one, moved to tears by the heroism during the Battle of Stalingrad rather than that at Pearl Harbor. Scaled up from the level of individual family histories, our big-picture group identities—the national identities and cultural principles that structure our lives— are just as arbitrary and subject to the vagaries of history.