To answer this well, it helps to know how the Supreme Court's idea of self-incrimination changed over time, because narco-analysis only fits under Article 20(3) once that idea widened.
For decades, courts read Article 20(3) narrowly, following State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad (1961), to cover only verbal or written statements and not things like fingerprints, handwriting samples, or blood samples, which were treated as physical evidence outside the clause.
Narco-analysis does not fit neatly into either old category. It is not a spoken confession given knowingly, and it is not a passive physical sample either. It sits in between: the drug suppresses conscious control, and whatever the person says comes from their own memory and knowledge.
In Selvi v. State of Karnataka (2010), the Supreme Court closed this gap by holding that compelling a person to undergo narco-analysis, polygraph, or brain-mapping tests amounts to testimonial compulsion, because it forces disclosure of facts from the accused's own mind. That places these tests squarely inside Article 20(3), not outside it as mere physical evidence.
Article 21 is not irrelevant here, since forcibly altering someone's mental state also touches personal liberty and privacy, but the provision that speaks directly to compelled self-incrimination, and the one the Court actually anchored its ruling to, is Article 20(3).
One way to reach the answer is to go through the candidates a student might guess and rule out the wrong ones first.
Could it be Article 14?Ruling out the general provisions leaves the specific one that actually fits the fact pattern.
\[ \boxed{\text{Article 20(3), the right against self-incrimination.}} \]