Comprehension
“The power to pardon is a part of the constitutional scheme, and we have no doubt, in our mind, that it should be so treated also in the Indian Republic. It has been reposed by the people through the Constitution in the Head of the State, and enjoys high status. It is a constitutional responsibility of great significance, to be exercised when occasion arises in accordance with the discretion contemplated by the context. It is not denied, and indeed it has been repeatedly affirmed in the course of argument by learned counsels appearing for the Petitioner that the power to pardon rests on the advice tendered by the Executive to the President, who subject to the provisions of Art. 74(1) of the Constitution, must act in accordance with such advice......”
We are of the view that it is open to the President in the exercise of the power vested in him by Art. 72 of the Constitution to scrutinise the evidence on the record of the criminal case and come to a different conclusion from that recorded by the court in regard to the guilt of, and sentence imposed on the accused. In doing so, the President does not amend or modify or supersede the judicial record. The judicial record remains intact, and undisturbed. The President acts in a wholly different plane from that in which the Court acted. He acts under a constitutional power, the nature of which is entirely different from the judicial power and cannot be regarded as an extension of it. This is so, notwithstanding that the practical effect of the Presidential act is to remove the stigma of guilt from the accused or to remit the sentence imposed on him.
It is apparent that the power under Art. 72 entitles the President to examine the record of evidence of the criminal case and to determine for himself whether the case is one deserving the grant of the relief falling within that power. We are of opinion that the President is
entitled to go into the merits of the case notwithstanding that it has been judicially concluded by the consideration given to it by this Court. In Kehar Singh v. Union of India, 1989 SC, this court stated that the same obviously means that the affected party need not be given the reasons. The question whether reasons can or cannot be disclosed to the Court when the same is challenged was not the subject-matter of consideration. In any event, the absence of any obligation to convey the reasons does not mean that there should not be legitimate
or relevant reasons for passing the order.
[Extract from the judgment of Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India 2014 (3) SCC 1]
Question: 1

Which one of the following statements is correct with respect to the granting of pardon by the President?

Updated On: Jan 13, 2026
  • The power to grant pardon is a constitutional duty. Hence, judicial review is available, just as any executive action
  • Granting pardon being the privilege of the President, no judicial review is available against the decision of the President in granting or refusing to grant a pardon
  • The constitution expressly conferred the power to grant pardon to the President hence, the President is not bound to rely on the aid advice of the executive
  • The President's power to grant pardon can be reviewed on the grounds of non-application of mind
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The Correct Option is D

Solution and Explanation

Article 72 of the Indian Constitution grants the President of India the power to pardon. This power, separate from the judiciary, operates independently and does not alter judicial rulings. The President can review case evidence and make an independent pardon decision.

However, the President acts on Executive advice, as per Article 74(1). Despite this, the President's decision can be judicially reviewed.

The statement "The President's power to grant pardon can be reviewed on the grounds of non-application of mind" is accurate. This means the decision can be challenged if the President did not properly consider the case's merits.

In summary, the power to pardon is constitutionally significant, but judicial review is possible if the decision-making process is flawed, maintaining checks and balances in the Indian legal system.

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Question: 2

In the above case the Supreme Court held that a minimum period of _______ days be stipulated between the receipt of communication of the rejection of the mercy petition and the scheduled date of execution.

Updated On: Jan 13, 2026
  • 15
  • 30
  • 14
  • No such time was fixed
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The Correct Option is C

Solution and Explanation

In Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India, the Supreme Court ruled that at least 14 days must separate the rejection of a mercy petition and the execution date. This allows the convict to prepare for their execution and have a final meeting with family. This period facilitates mental preparation and the pursuit of legal remedies. The 14-day requirement demonstrates a humane approach to capital punishment, upholding the convict's rights and dignity until the end.
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Question: 3

What is not true about Art. 21 of Constitution of India?

Updated On: Jan 13, 2026
  • Insanity is not a relevant supervening factor for commutation of death sentence
  • Right to life of a person continues till his last breath and that Court will protect that right even if the noose is being tied on the condemned person's neck
  • The anguish of alternating hope and despair, the agony of uncertainty and the consequence of such suffering on the mental, emotional and physical integrity and health violates Art. 21 of the prisoners
  • Art. 21 is a substantive right and not merely procedural
Show Solution

The Correct Option is A

Solution and Explanation

Article 21 of the Indian Constitution ensures the right to life and personal liberty, a fundamental and substantive right. We will now assess statements related to Article 21, identifying the false one:

  • The statement "Insanity is not a relevant supervening factor for commutation of death sentence" is incorrect. Insanity is a crucial factor in death sentence commutation, reflecting legal precedent and compassion. This contradicts the understanding of Article 21.
  • "Right to life of a person continues till his last breath and that Court will protect that right even if the noose is being tied on the condemned person's neck" aligns with Article 21, affirming the court's role in protecting life until death.
  • "The anguish of alternating hope and despair, the agony of uncertainty and the consequence of such suffering on the mental, emotional and physical integrity and health violates Art. 21 of the prisoners" correctly addresses the protection of mental and physical well-being under Article 21, extending to prisoners' rights against suffering from lengthy legal procedures.
  • "Art. 21 is a substantive right and not merely procedural" accurately portrays Article 21 as a core right, safeguarding personal liberty and life beyond procedural limitations.
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Question: 4

In which case, the Supreme Court held that if the crime is brutal and heinous and involves the killing of a large number of innocent people without any reason, delay cannot be the sole factor for the commutation of the death sentence to life imprisonment?

Updated On: Jan 13, 2026
  • Devender Pal Singh Bhullar v. State (NCT) of Delhi
  • V. Sriharan Murugan v. Union of India
  • Yakub Abdul Razak Memon v. State of Maharashtra
  • Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India
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The Correct Option is A

Solution and Explanation

The Supreme Court case, Devender Pal Singh Bhullar v. State (NCT) of Delhi, established that extreme brutality and mass killing negate the impact of sentencing delays when considering a death sentence commutation to life imprisonment. This landmark ruling prioritized the heinous nature of the crime over procedural delays as a mitigating factor. The court determined that the severity of the crime should outweigh sentencing delays when deciding on mercy. This decision reinforced the view that the power of pardon is not automatic but depends on justice and the crime's nature. Devender Pal Singh Bhullar was crucial in reasserting this balance between mercy and justice in the Indian legal system, specifically in the context of exceptionally brutal crimes.
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Question: 5

The President's power to grant a pardon

Updated On: Jan 13, 2026
  • Can be delegated to the Council of Ministers
  • Cannot be delegated as it is an essential legislative function
  • Cannot be delegated as it is expressly conferred on the President
  • Can be delegated to the Vice-president in the absence of the President
Show Solution

The Correct Option is C

Solution and Explanation

This addresses the President's pardon power under the Indian Constitution, a crucial authority supported by legal precedent (Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India 2014 (3) SCC 1).

The President's pardon power is non-delegable because:

  • Constitutional Basis: Article 72 of the Indian Constitution directly grants the pardon power to the President, reflecting its significance and the office's entrusted authority.
  • Non-Transferable: The power is intrinsic to the constitutional framework and cannot be delegated, not even to the Council of Ministers or the Vice-President; it operates independently of legislative or judicial functions.
  • Executive Guidance: While the President acts on Executive advice per Article 74(1), the non-delegable nature of the power is preserved due to its unique constitutional status, specifically assigned to the President.

In short, the President's pardon power is a distinct constitutional prerogative, independently exercised, with Executive advice, but non-delegable and exclusive to the President.

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Top Questions on Constitutional Laws

Questions Asked in CLAT PG exam

An unpleasant tussle ensured between the TATA Sons and Cyrus Pallonji Mistry (“CPM”) in October 2016, when Mistry, who was the sixth chairman of Tata Sons, was ousted from the position of Executive Chairman of Tata Sons Limited. CPM took over as the chairman in 2012 after Ratan Tata announced his retirement. Tata Group patriarch Ratan Tata had personally asked Cyrus Mistry to resign as chairman of Tata Sons as the board had lost faith in him, but his refusal led to the removal via majority vote. Cyrus Investments Private limited and Sterling Investment Corporation Private Limited belonged to the Shapoorji Palloni Group in which CPM held a controlling interest (about 2% of the issued share capital of Tata Sons). Seven out of the nine directors of Tata Sons voted for CPM’s replacement after Farida Khambata abstained and Mistry was declared ineligible to vote as he was an interested director. Mistry challenged his removal, accusing the board of mismanagement and of oppressing minority shareholders. however, the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) rejected his petition. After this Mistry challenged his removal in National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). In 2018, NCLAT order restored Mistry as the group’s executive chairman. Tata Sons challenged that NCLAT order in Supreme Court. CPM also challenged the order for few more relief. Supreme Court stayed NCLAT’s order reinstating Cyrus Mistry as the executive chairman of Tata Sons and restoring his directorships in the holding company as well as three group companies, with a preliminary observation that the first impression of the order was “not good” and that the tribunal ‘could’ not have given consequential relief that had not been sought in the first place. Ultimately, the Supreme Court decided the case in favour of Tata Sons. One of the issues decided by Supreme Court was that “whether the case was fit to be qualified as a situation of ‘Oppression and Mismanagement’ under Section 241 of the Companies Act, 2013?”. On this issue, the Supreme Court observed that “unless the removal of a person as a chairman of a company is oppressive or mismanaged or done in a prejudicial manner damaging the interests of the company, its members or the public at large, the NCLT cannot interfere with the removal of a person as a Chairman of a Company in a petition under Section 241 of the Companies Act, 2013.” This case highlighted the point that “an executive chairman does not have sovereign authority over the company. In corporate democracy, decision making always remains with the Board as long as they enjoy the pleasure of the shareholders. Likewise, an executive chairman will continue as long as he/she enjoys the pleasure of the Board. An assumption by the executive chairman that he/she would have a free hand in running the affairs of the company is incongruous to corporate governance and corporate democracy. The Tribunal held that the concept of ‘free hand rule’ is antithesis to collective responsibility and collective decision making”.
[Based on Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. v. Cyrus Investment Pvt. Ltd., 2021 SCC 122].
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Alastair Hudson in his book ‘Securities Law’ First Edition (Sweet & Maxwell), 2008 at page 342, refers to ‘Restricted Offers’ and noticed that there is no contravention of Section 85 of FSMA 2000, if: “(b) the offer is made to or directed at fewer than 100 persons, other than qualified investors, per EEA State”. The purpose underlying that exemption, the author says, is mainly the fact that the offer is not being made to an appreciable section of “the public” such that the policy of the prospectus rules generally is not affected. Further, the author says that “Self-evidently, while an offer to 99 ordinary members of the public would be within the literal terms of the exemption, it would not be the sort of activity anticipated by the legislation. Moreover, if a marketing campaign were arranged such that ordinary members of the people were approached in groups of 99 people at a time in an effort to avoid the prospectus rules, then that would not appear to be within the spirit of the regulations and might be held to contravene the core principle that a regulated person must act with integrity.”
I may, therefore, indicate, subject to what has been stated above, in India that any share or debenture issue beyond forty-nine persons, would be a public issue attracting all the relevant provisions of the SEBI Act, regulations framed thereunder, the Companies Act, pertaining to the public issue. Facts clearly reveal that Saharas have issued securities to the public more than the threshold limit statutorily fixed under the first proviso to Section 67(3) and hence violated the listing provisions which may attract civil and criminal liabilities. Principles of listing, which I may later on discuss, is intended to assist public companies in identifying their obligations and responsibilities, which are continuing in nature, transparent in content and call for high degree of integrity. Obligations are imposed on the issuer on an ongoing basis. Public companies who are legally obliged to list their securities are deemed to accept the continuing obligations, by virtue of their application, prospectus and the subsequent maintenance of listing on a recognized stock exchange. Disclosure is the rule, there is no exception. Misleading public is a serious crime, which may attract civil and criminal liability. Listing of securities depends not upon one’s volition, but on statutory mandate.
[Extract from Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited v. Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), Para 89-91, Civil Appeal No. 9833/2011 (SC)]
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The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words, they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past, it was thought that it included just two rules namely: (1) no one shall be a judge in his own case (Nemo debet esse judex propria causa) and (2) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem).
Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice. Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is not questioned.
If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi-judicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry as observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala [Civil Appeal No. 990/68, decided on 15-07- 1968], the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case.
[Extract from the judgment of the Supreme Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262, decided on April 29, 1969, hereafter ‘A.K. Kraipak’].
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The doctrine of promissory estoppel is by now well recognized and well defined by a catena of decisions of this Court. Where the Government makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promise and, in fact, the promise, acting in reliance on it, alters his position, the Government would be held bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Government at the instance of the promise notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 229 of the Constitution. The rule of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine has to be moulded to suit the particular situation. It is not a hard-and-fast rule but an elastic one, the objective of which is to do justice between the parties and to extend an equitable treatment to them. This doctrine is a principle evolved by equity, to avoid injustice and though commonly named promissory estoppel, it is neither in the realm of contract nor in the realm of estoppel. For application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel the promise must establish that he suffered in detriment or altered his position by reliance on the promise.
Normally, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is being applied against the Government and defence based on executive necessity would not be accepted by the court. However, if it can be shown by the Government that having regard to the facts as they have subsequently transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government to the promise made by it, the court would not raise an equity in favour of the promise and enforce the promise against the Government. Where public interest warrants, the principles of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked. The Government can change the policy in public interest. However, it is well settled that taking cue from this doctrine, the authority cannot be compelled to do something which is not allowed by law or prohibited by law. There is no promissory estoppel against the settled proposition of law. Doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked for enforcement of a promise made contrary to law, because none can be compelled to act against the statute. Thus, the Government or public authority cannot be compelled to make a provision which is contrary to law.
[Extract from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shree Sidhbali Steels Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2011) 3 SCC 193, decided on January 20, 2011, hereafter ‘Shree Sidhbali Steels’].
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