Question

The above passage has been taken from which of the following judgments, which decided the state of affairs relating to internet ban in Jammu & Kashmir?

• A. Sita Ram Yechury v. Union of India
• B. Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India
• C. In Re: State of Jammu & Kashmir
• D. Bhim Singh v. State of Jammu & Kashmir
• A. The limitations of state action sanctioned under the Constitution.
• B. The powers of the President under Article 370 of the Constitution.
• C. The extent of restrictions to be imposed by the State on the exercise of Fundamental Rights
• D. The proportionality of powers and duties under the Constitution.
• A. The application of Part-III is subject to the interest of the majority and it overrides the rights of an individual.
• B. The state may act in derogation of the Fundamental Rights of the people to achieve a higher public good and the social equilibrium.
• C. The Fundamental Rights of citizens are secondary and the authority of State over its citizens is primary and of utmost importance.
• D. The above approach is suitable only for the American Constitution as no limitation on rights is mentioned in the text of the Constitution.
• A. Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India.
• B. Irtiqa Iqbal v. Union of India
• C. Kapil Sibal v. Union of India
• D. None of the above.
• A. A complete internet ban for indefinite period in a state effected by terrorism, insurgency and local militia.
• B. A slowdown of the internet speed in a State, affecting the Right of Free speech and expression and trade, business and occupation
• C. House arrest of eminent political leaders for an indefinite period
• D. A complete lockdown in an area effected by militant attacks for an indefinite period.
• A. Legality, which postulates the existence of law which is enacted to restrict the application of Fundamental Rights.
• B. Need, defined in terms of a legitimate State aim.
• C. Proportionality, which ensures a rational nexus between the objects and the means adopted to achieve them.
• D. Consequence, which the restriction would ensue after its application.
• A. Freedom of Speech and Expression
• B. Right to carry out trade, business and occupation
• C. Right to Life
• D. All of the above.
• A. The Secretary to the Government of India in the Ministry of Home Affairs.
• B. The Secretary to the Government of India in the Ministry of Information andBroadcasting
• C. A District Magistrate, exercising his powers under S.144 of the Cr. P. C
• D. The Chief Secretary to the Government of State in the Ministry of Home Affairs.
• A. Any Bill to alter the boundaries of the State shall be introduced in the Parliament after the recommendation of the Governor of the State.
• B. No Bill can be introduced in the Parliament for the alteration of the boundaries of the State without the consent of the Legislature of the State.
• C. No Bill can be introduced in the Parliament for the alteration of the boundaries of the State without the consent of the Constituent Assembly of the State.
• D. No Bill can be introduced in the Parliament for the alteration of the boundaries of the State without the consent of the President.
• A. The Act has amended Schedule 1 of the Constitution
• B. The Act has amended Article 4 of the Constitution
• C. The Act has amended Schedule 4 of the Constitution.
• D. None of the above.

Answer 1

The Correct Option is B

The passage is unmistakably about testing internet restrictions against the proportionality standard, which narrows the search to the one Jammu & Kashmir case built around exactly that question.

1. Option (A): Sita Ram Yechury v. Union of India is not connected with this subject matter.
2. Option (B): Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India is the case that examined the internet suspension in Jammu & Kashmir and laid down the proportionality test used to assess it, matching the passage exactly.
3. Option (C): In Re: State of Jammu & Kashmir does not develop this proportionality reasoning.
4. Option (D): Bhim Singh v. State of Jammu & Kashmir deals with unlawful detention, an unrelated issue.

The subject matter, internet restrictions and proportionality, points squarely to option (B).

Answer 2

Reading the passage's own vocabulary, "restriction," "legitimate interest," "not disproportionate," makes clear what proportionality is being used to measure here.

1. Option (A): Too broad, this covers state action generally, not specifically the curbing of rights.
2. Option (B): Unrelated, Article 370 concerns a different constitutional question entirely.
3. Option (C): Matches directly, the passage is testing how far the state may go in restricting the exercise of Fundamental Rights.
4. Option (D): Reframes the issue as inter-organ powers and duties, which the passage does not discuss.

Option (C) captures the actual subject of the passage's proportionality discussion.

Answer 3

The passage is contrasting Dworkin's absolute "rights as trumps" theory with India's structured, limitation-friendly Part III, so the correct option should capture that structured flexibility rather than an absolute claim in either direction.

1. Option (A): Overstates the point, majority interest overriding rights is not what the passage says, it only notes built-in limitations within Part III.
2. Option (B): Matches the passage, since it reflects that rights can be proportionately restricted to serve a legitimate public good, consistent with Part III's inbuilt structure.
3. Option (C): Overstates the point in the other direction, treating rights as merely secondary to state authority, which the passage does not say.
4. Option (D): Only addresses why the American approach might not fit, without stating the Indian position the passage actually explains.

Option (B) is the one that accurately reflects the structured limitation the passage describes.

Answer 4

This question can be answered simply by recalling which case first held that internet access falls within Article 19, since that fact is closely associated with a single well-known decision.

1. Option (A): Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India is that decision, holding that the internet is a medium for exercising the freedoms under Article 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g).
2. Option (B): Irtiqa Iqbal v. Union of India is not an authority on this point.
3. Option (C): Kapil Sibal v. Union of India is not a judgment at all in this context, and carries no such holding.
4. Option (D): Ruled out because option (A) is a genuine, correct match.

Option (A), Anuradha Bhasin, is the case that established this principle.

Answer 5

The pattern across these four options is "complete and indefinite" versus "partial and calibrated," and only the calibrated measure survives the proportionality test.

1. Option (A): Complete and indefinite, fails proportionality regardless of the underlying security threat.
2. Option (B): Partial and calibrated, restricts speed rather than cutting access entirely, which is the kind of measured response proportionality favours.
3. Option (C): Indefinite detention without a defined endpoint, fails for the same reason as option (A).
4. Option (D): Complete and indefinite lockdown, again too broad and open-ended to satisfy proportionality.

Only the calibrated slowdown in option (B) reflects a restriction proportionate to the stated aim.

Answer 6

The proportionality framework used in Indian constitutional law has four settled limbs: legality, legitimate aim, proportionality (rational nexus), and procedural safeguards, so checking each option against that list quickly isolates the odd one out.

1. Option (A): Legality is the first limb, requiring an actual law behind the restriction.
2. Option (B): Need, or legitimate aim, is the second limb.
3. Option (C): Proportionality, the rational nexus between means and ends, is the third limb.
4. Option (D): Consequence is not one of the four limbs at all, the real fourth limb is procedural safeguards, not an assessment of after-the-fact consequences.

Since A, B, and C map onto three of the four real limbs and D does not correspond to any of them, D is the one that is not an essential of the test.

Answer 7

The Supreme Court's ruling in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020) is the direct reference point for this question, and it ties internet access to more than one constitutional guarantee at once.

1. Freedom of speech and expression: publishing, browsing, and communicating online is treated as an exercise of Article 19(1)(a).
2. Trade, business and occupation: online commerce, banking and professional services fall under the Article 19(1)(g) freedom to carry on trade or business.
3. Right to life: education, healthcare access and livelihood increasingly depend on connectivity, linking internet access to the dignity component of Article 21.

Since the judgment does not confine internet access to just one of these rights but treats it as an enabler of all three together, the option listing all three is the correct one, so the answer is All of the above.

Answer 8

Rule 2 of the Temporary Suspension of Telecom Services (Public Emergency or Public Safety) Rules, 2017 fixes exactly who may pass a suspension order.

1. Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Secretary: handles broadcast content regulation, not telecom suspension, so this option is ruled out.
2. District Magistrate under Section 144 CrPC: that provision is a general law and order tool separate from the telecom-specific Rules, so this too is ruled out.
3. State Chief Secretary in the Home Ministry: the Rules use a different designation, the Secretary in-charge of the Home Department, so this label does not correspond to the authority the Rules actually create.

What remains is the Union Home Secretary, the officer the 2017 Rules name for issuing a suspension order, which makes The Secretary to the Government of India in the Ministry of Home Affairs the correct choice.

Answer 9

Article 370 modified the ordinary Article 3 procedure specifically for Jammu and Kashmir, and the modification is best understood by comparing it with the general rule that applies to every other state.

1. General rule (all other states): under Article 3, the President refers a boundary bill to the state legislature for its views within a fixed time, but Parliament is not bound by that view and can proceed regardless.
2. J&K's special rule: the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, issued under Article 370(1)(d), inserted a proviso making the State Legislature's consent a mandatory precondition, not merely an opinion to be sought, before any such bill could even be introduced in Parliament.
3. Why the Constituent Assembly and President options fail: the State's Constituent Assembly had dissolved decades earlier, and the President's function in this process was procedural, not the special consent safeguard.

This makes the requirement of the State Legislature's consent the correct description of the pre-August 2019 position, so option B is right.

Answer 10

Article 4 does not get amended by reorganisation laws, it is the provision that authorises them, so this question turns on separating the enabling power from what actually gets changed.

1. What Article 4 does: it lets a law passed under Article 2 or 3 make consequential changes to the First Schedule, the list of states and territories, and the Fourth Schedule, the Rajya Sabha seat allocation, without those changes counting as a formal Article 368 amendment.
2. What the 2019 Act actually changed: the entries in Schedule 1, creating the Union Territories of J&K and Ladakh, and the seat allocation in Schedule 4, both permitted by Article 4.
3. What it did not do: it did not alter the text of Article 4 itself, since Article 4 is the source of the power, not a target of it.

So the statement claiming the Act amended Article 4 is the inaccurate one, making Option B the correct choice for this not-true question.