Comprehension
Article 14 of the Constitution stipulates that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of laws within the territory of India. Article 15(1) states that the State should not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. Article 15(4) stipulates that nothing in Article 15 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. Article 16 deals with equality of opportunity in matters of public employment. Clause (1) of Article 16 guarantees equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. Clause (2) stipulates that no citizen shall be discriminated in or be ineligible for any employment or office under the State on the grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them. Clause (4) of the provision states that nothing in Article 16 shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens, which in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State. The purpose of the equal opportunity principle in Article 16(1) and the reservation provision in Article 16(4) has emerged as a focal point of the jurisprudence on reservations in this Court. A discussion of the journey of the competing models of equality that the Court has espoused and their evolution over the course of the years is necessary to understand the constitutional vision on equality.
The impugned constitutional amendments by which Article 16 (4-A) and 16 (4-B) have been inserted, flow from Article 16 (4). They do not alter the structure of Article 16 (4). They retain the controlling factors or the compelling reasons which enables the State to provide for reservation keeping in mind the overall efficiency of the state administration under article 335. Sub-categorization within a class is a constitutional requirement to secure substantive equality in the event that there is a distinction between two sections of a class; Sub-classification must not lead to the exclusion of one of the categories in the class. A model that provides sufficient opportunities to all categories of the class must be adopted; and Sub-classification among a class must be on a reasonable basis.
Justice Bela Trivedi opined, in dissent, that presidential list of scheduled castes notified under Article 341 cannot be altered by the States. Any change to this list can only be made by a law enacted by Parliament. Sub-classification, according to her would amount to tampering with the Presidential List and undermine the object Article 341, which aims to eliminate political influence in the SC-ST List. Further, she emphasised the importance of adhering to the rule of plain and literal interpretation. She mentions that any preferential treatment for a sub-class within the presidential list would deprive other classes within the same category of their benefits. In the absence of executive or legislative power, state lack the competence to sub-classify castes and the benefit reserved for all SCs. Allowing states to do so would constitute a colourable exercise of power, which is impermissible under law. Justice Trivedi concluded by affirming that affirmative action by States must remain within constitutional boundaries and held that the law laid down in E.V. Chinnaiah case was correct and should be upheld.
(Extract from The State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors. 2024 SC)
Question: 1

The issue of whether the State can further sub-classify within a class for the purpose of reservation first arose in:

Updated On: Jan 13, 2026
  • M.R Balaji v. State of Mysore
  • T. Devadasan v. Union of India
  • Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Railway) v. Union of India
  • The State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors. 2020
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The Correct Option is A

Solution and Explanation

The initial legal consideration of whether a State could further categorize within a class for reservation purposes occurred in M.R Balaji v. State of Mysore.
This overview examines multiple articles of the Indian Constitution concerning equality and reservation:
  • Article 14: Establishes equality before the law and equal legal protection.
  • Article 15: Forbids discrimination based on religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth. Article 15(4) enables the State to create special provisions for socially and educationally disadvantaged groups.
  • Article 16: Guarantees equal opportunity in public employment. Clause (4) permits reservations for underrepresented backward classes in government services.
The analysis highlights the constitutional approach to equality, with emphasis on Articles 16(4), 16(4-A), and 16(4-B), which govern reservation. Key considerations include:
  • Amendments 16(4-A) and 16(4-B) maintain the structure of Article 16(4).
  • Sub-categorization within a class must be rational and inclusive of all categories.
Justice Bela Trivedi's dissenting view stresses that alterations to the Presidential List of Scheduled Castes (Article 341) necessitate Parliamentary consent. She posits that sub-categorization could compromise Article 341's goal of preventing political interference, advocating for equitable treatment across all classes within the Presidential List.
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Question: 2

Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, while proposing the inclusion of Articles 300A and 300B of the Draft Constitution (which correspond to Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution), indicated that once notified, any elimination from the list or an addition to the list was to be made by Parliament and not by the President. This limitation was imposed to:

Updated On: Jan 13, 2026
  • Protect the rights of the SCs and STs class people
  • To exclude the further interference of the Executive having a play in the matter of the disturbance in the Schedule so published by the President
  • To remove the discretion in the hands of Executive to save the interest of the SCs and STs people
  • To eliminate “political factors” from disturbing the list
Show Solution

The Correct Option is D

Solution and Explanation

Dr. B.R. Ambedkar wanted only Parliament to change the Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) lists. This was to prevent "political factors" from affecting the lists. This would keep changes to the lists, which determine who gets constitutional protections, fair and free from political influence at the state or executive level.

To understand this, consider these constitutional articles:

  • Article 14: Everyone is equal before the law, and the State can't deny anyone legal equality.
  • Article 15(1): The State can't discriminate based on caste or religion.
  • Article 15(4): The State can make special provisions to help socially and educationally backward classes, including SCs and STs.
  • Article 16: Equal job opportunities are ensured, and reservations are allowed for backward classes to address underrepresentation.

Limiting changes to the SC/ST lists to Parliament protects these groups from political manipulation, as supported by court rulings and interpretations of equality.

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Question: 3

The trinity of Articles 14, 15, and 16 has provided a tool to march towards social and economic equality. Emphasis has been given to affirmative action so as to give a special treatment to the underprivileged so that they can march forward. Reservations in the matters of education and in public employment have been used to provide a special treatment to the backward classes. What are the other articles of the Constitution along with, the objective of the Constitution to achieve social economic equality may be achieved?

Updated On: Jan 13, 2026
  • Arts. 46, 335 and 338
  • Arts. 335, 341 and 342
  • Arts. 46, 335, 338, 341 and 342
  • Arts. 46, 335 and 342
Show Solution

The Correct Option is C

Solution and Explanation

Articles 14, 15, and 16 focus on equality and affirmative action for disadvantaged groups. The following constitutional articles support these goals:
  • Article 46: Mandates state action to uplift the educational and economic status of Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST), and other vulnerable groups.
  • Article 335: Guarantees consideration for SCs and STs in government jobs, while maintaining administrative efficiency.
  • Article 338: Creates the National Commission for SCs to examine and oversee protections for them.
  • Article 341: Enables the President to identify Castes, Races, or Tribes as SCs, facilitating targeted assistance.
  • Article 342: Authorizes the President to specify Tribes or Tribal Communities as STs, ensuring specific welfare programs.
Considering the given choices, Arts. 46, 335, 338, 341 and 342 correctly complements Articles 14, 15, and 16, thereby contributing to the constitutional aim of social and economic equality.
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Question: 4

Hon’ble Justice B.R. Gavai, in the above-mentioned judgment held that, “sub-classification amongst the Scheduled Castes for giving more beneficial treatment is permissible in law. He also gave some criteria on which the sub-classification may be implemented by the State. Which of the following is that criteria?

Updated On: Jan 13, 2026
  • The criteria for exclusion of the creamy layer from the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for the purpose of affirmative action could be different from the criteria as applicable to the Other Backward Classes
  • Sub-classification would be permissible only if there is a reservation for a sub-class as well as the larger class
  • That while doing so, the State will have to justify the same on the basis of empirical data that a sub-class in whose favour such more beneficial treatment is provided is not adequately represented
  • All of the above
Show Solution

The Correct Option is D

Solution and Explanation

Hon'ble Justice B.R. Gavai's ruling outlines key factors for permissible sub-classification within Scheduled Castes for more advantageous treatment:
  1. Creamy layer exclusion criteria may differ between Scheduled Castes/Tribes and Other Backward Classes.
  2. Sub-classification requires reservation for both the sub-class and the larger class.
  3. States must provide empirical data proving under-representation of a sub-class receiving preferential treatment.
These essential criteria collectively constitute the correct answer: "All of the above."
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Question: 5

Which of the following is not required for sub-classification of the Scheduled Caste?

Updated On: Jan 13, 2026
  • The inadequacy of representation of a caste/group because of its backwardness
  • The data must be collected by the State on the inadequacy of representation of a caste in the “services of the State” because it is used as an indicator of backwardness
  • Efficiency of administration must be viewed in a manner which promotes inclusion and equality as required by Article 16(1)
  • The State in exercise of the power under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) is not required
Show Solution

The Correct Option is D

Solution and Explanation

The question aims to identify the statement NOT needed for sub-classification of Scheduled Castes. An understanding of constitutional articles on equality and reservation is essential.

Key points:

  • Article 14: Equal protection of laws.
  • Article 15: Prohibits discrimination but allows special provisions for backward classes, SCs, and STs (Article 15(4)).
  • Article 16: Equality in public employment, with reservations for underrepresented backward classes (Article 16(4)).
  • Sub-classification: Requires a reasonable basis, preserves opportunities within a class, and does not alter the Presidential List (Justice Bela Trivedi’s dissent).

Option analysis:

  1. Representation inadequacy of a caste/group due to backwardness: Necessary for reservation justification (Article 16(4)).
  2. State data collection on representation inadequacy in “services of the State”: Required as a backwardness indicator.
  3. Administrative efficiency promoting inclusion and equality (Article 16(1)): Consideration needed for administrative balance regarding reservations (Article 335).
  4. The State is not required to exercise power under Articles 15(4) and 16(4): This statement is incorrect; the State is empowered and required.

Therefore, the correct answer is: The State in exercise of the power under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) is not required.

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Top Questions on Constitutional Laws

Questions Asked in CLAT PG exam

An unpleasant tussle ensured between the TATA Sons and Cyrus Pallonji Mistry (“CPM”) in October 2016, when Mistry, who was the sixth chairman of Tata Sons, was ousted from the position of Executive Chairman of Tata Sons Limited. CPM took over as the chairman in 2012 after Ratan Tata announced his retirement. Tata Group patriarch Ratan Tata had personally asked Cyrus Mistry to resign as chairman of Tata Sons as the board had lost faith in him, but his refusal led to the removal via majority vote. Cyrus Investments Private limited and Sterling Investment Corporation Private Limited belonged to the Shapoorji Palloni Group in which CPM held a controlling interest (about 2% of the issued share capital of Tata Sons). Seven out of the nine directors of Tata Sons voted for CPM’s replacement after Farida Khambata abstained and Mistry was declared ineligible to vote as he was an interested director. Mistry challenged his removal, accusing the board of mismanagement and of oppressing minority shareholders. however, the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) rejected his petition. After this Mistry challenged his removal in National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). In 2018, NCLAT order restored Mistry as the group’s executive chairman. Tata Sons challenged that NCLAT order in Supreme Court. CPM also challenged the order for few more relief. Supreme Court stayed NCLAT’s order reinstating Cyrus Mistry as the executive chairman of Tata Sons and restoring his directorships in the holding company as well as three group companies, with a preliminary observation that the first impression of the order was “not good” and that the tribunal ‘could’ not have given consequential relief that had not been sought in the first place. Ultimately, the Supreme Court decided the case in favour of Tata Sons. One of the issues decided by Supreme Court was that “whether the case was fit to be qualified as a situation of ‘Oppression and Mismanagement’ under Section 241 of the Companies Act, 2013?”. On this issue, the Supreme Court observed that “unless the removal of a person as a chairman of a company is oppressive or mismanaged or done in a prejudicial manner damaging the interests of the company, its members or the public at large, the NCLT cannot interfere with the removal of a person as a Chairman of a Company in a petition under Section 241 of the Companies Act, 2013.” This case highlighted the point that “an executive chairman does not have sovereign authority over the company. In corporate democracy, decision making always remains with the Board as long as they enjoy the pleasure of the shareholders. Likewise, an executive chairman will continue as long as he/she enjoys the pleasure of the Board. An assumption by the executive chairman that he/she would have a free hand in running the affairs of the company is incongruous to corporate governance and corporate democracy. The Tribunal held that the concept of ‘free hand rule’ is antithesis to collective responsibility and collective decision making”.
[Based on Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. v. Cyrus Investment Pvt. Ltd., 2021 SCC 122].
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Alastair Hudson in his book ‘Securities Law’ First Edition (Sweet & Maxwell), 2008 at page 342, refers to ‘Restricted Offers’ and noticed that there is no contravention of Section 85 of FSMA 2000, if: “(b) the offer is made to or directed at fewer than 100 persons, other than qualified investors, per EEA State”. The purpose underlying that exemption, the author says, is mainly the fact that the offer is not being made to an appreciable section of “the public” such that the policy of the prospectus rules generally is not affected. Further, the author says that “Self-evidently, while an offer to 99 ordinary members of the public would be within the literal terms of the exemption, it would not be the sort of activity anticipated by the legislation. Moreover, if a marketing campaign were arranged such that ordinary members of the people were approached in groups of 99 people at a time in an effort to avoid the prospectus rules, then that would not appear to be within the spirit of the regulations and might be held to contravene the core principle that a regulated person must act with integrity.”
I may, therefore, indicate, subject to what has been stated above, in India that any share or debenture issue beyond forty-nine persons, would be a public issue attracting all the relevant provisions of the SEBI Act, regulations framed thereunder, the Companies Act, pertaining to the public issue. Facts clearly reveal that Saharas have issued securities to the public more than the threshold limit statutorily fixed under the first proviso to Section 67(3) and hence violated the listing provisions which may attract civil and criminal liabilities. Principles of listing, which I may later on discuss, is intended to assist public companies in identifying their obligations and responsibilities, which are continuing in nature, transparent in content and call for high degree of integrity. Obligations are imposed on the issuer on an ongoing basis. Public companies who are legally obliged to list their securities are deemed to accept the continuing obligations, by virtue of their application, prospectus and the subsequent maintenance of listing on a recognized stock exchange. Disclosure is the rule, there is no exception. Misleading public is a serious crime, which may attract civil and criminal liability. Listing of securities depends not upon one’s volition, but on statutory mandate.
[Extract from Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited v. Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), Para 89-91, Civil Appeal No. 9833/2011 (SC)]
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The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words, they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past, it was thought that it included just two rules namely: (1) no one shall be a judge in his own case (Nemo debet esse judex propria causa) and (2) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem).
Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice. Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is not questioned.
If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi-judicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry as observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala [Civil Appeal No. 990/68, decided on 15-07- 1968], the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case.
[Extract from the judgment of the Supreme Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262, decided on April 29, 1969, hereafter ‘A.K. Kraipak’].
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The doctrine of promissory estoppel is by now well recognized and well defined by a catena of decisions of this Court. Where the Government makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promise and, in fact, the promise, acting in reliance on it, alters his position, the Government would be held bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Government at the instance of the promise notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 229 of the Constitution. The rule of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine has to be moulded to suit the particular situation. It is not a hard-and-fast rule but an elastic one, the objective of which is to do justice between the parties and to extend an equitable treatment to them. This doctrine is a principle evolved by equity, to avoid injustice and though commonly named promissory estoppel, it is neither in the realm of contract nor in the realm of estoppel. For application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel the promise must establish that he suffered in detriment or altered his position by reliance on the promise.
Normally, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is being applied against the Government and defence based on executive necessity would not be accepted by the court. However, if it can be shown by the Government that having regard to the facts as they have subsequently transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government to the promise made by it, the court would not raise an equity in favour of the promise and enforce the promise against the Government. Where public interest warrants, the principles of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked. The Government can change the policy in public interest. However, it is well settled that taking cue from this doctrine, the authority cannot be compelled to do something which is not allowed by law or prohibited by law. There is no promissory estoppel against the settled proposition of law. Doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked for enforcement of a promise made contrary to law, because none can be compelled to act against the statute. Thus, the Government or public authority cannot be compelled to make a provision which is contrary to law.
[Extract from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shree Sidhbali Steels Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2011) 3 SCC 193, decided on January 20, 2011, hereafter ‘Shree Sidhbali Steels’].
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