Comprehension
Read the piece written by Prof. Upendra Baxi and answer the questions below:
No matter how the matters are for the time being resolved (and swiftly on all indications), the present crisis in the Supreme Court involves mainly a contention on how judicial business should be conducted. The extraordinary movement of four justices in making public a letter addressed to the Chief Justice of India (CJI) in November 2017, and assorted observations at the press conference last week are very unusual judicial happenings. At that conference, Justice Chelameswar said that “less than desirable things have happened” and the protesting Justices vainly “tried to collectively persuade” the CJI to take “remedial measures”. These happenings are now made even more unusual by Justice Ranjan Gogoi reportedly denying any “crisis|” and Justice Kurian Joseph saying the matter is now settled leaving little scope for “outside intervention”. However, the letter released at the press conference said otherwise; it spoke of the ways in which “the overall functioning of the justice delivery system”, the “independence of the high courts”, and the functioning of the office of the CJI have been “adversely affected”. A moving appeal to the Indian “Nation" was issued at the press conference and Justice Chelameswar justified speaking out, lest ”wise people" say later that they were complicit. A situation where four senior-most justices went public to express their discontent with the present CJI‘s exercise of authority to constitute Benches raises grave constitutional questions. Although only an in-house rectification can save matters, it is an anti-democratic error of grave proportions to think that co-citizens should have no interest, stake, or say in the matter. Undoubtedly, the Chief Justices, whether of the High courts or the Supreme Court, have the power to order the roster. The question is whether that power is coupled with a constitutional duty to follow certain conventions. Obviously, there are a few: Chief Justices have a primary duty of accountability to the Brother Justices, the Bar, and a general obligation through the Bar to the litigating public and people at large. But when a letter by four Senior Justices has been ignored for about two months, is going public with a copy of that letter and holding even a press conference unjudicial? On this question opinions are varied. Some have lauded this step as heroic while others regard this as "sheer trade union tactics‖ and some even say the step was extremely unfortunate but now some institutional solidarity should pave the path ahead. What are the other conventions? First, a part-heard matter may not be divested from the co-justices who are seized with it. Second, the CJI may not deny a request for recusal on grounds of conflict of interest. Third, the Chief Justice may not ignore the requests by co-justices to form a larger Bench. Fourth, a Chief Justice may not selectively assign sensitive or important cases to the same judges. However, fifth, it is doubtful whether there is, or ought to be, a convention requiring such matters to be heard only by the senior-most justices. No, because the decision to elevate a citizen to judgeship
must involve all relevant considerations; once elevated, a justice is co-equal to all other brethren. Sixth, it is true that co-equality occurs within a hierarchy: Not every justice becomes a Chief Justice, and the SC collegium must comprise the five senior-most justices. Outside this framework, the question about the rank-ordering may not arise; all Justices speak for the constitutional court. Any discussion about benches headed by “junior” justices is therefore injudicious. The second issue looming large is the finalisation of Memorandum of Procedure (MoP). In early July 2017 (in Justice Karnan‘s case), at least two Justices observed a need “to revisit the process of appointment of judges and establishment of a mechanism for corrective measures other than impeachment”. The letter also suggests that the issue of MoP "cannot linger on for indefinite period" and since the government has not responded to the MoP sent as far back as March 2017, the Court must now presume this long “silence” amounts to acceptance. Convening a full court and/or an agreement of the Chief Justices‘ conference stand was suggested. The highest court in the land cannot endlessly wait for the government. The remedies of impeachment and removal for judicial misconduct and review, and now curative jurisdiction, constitutionally exist. And further, the spectre of the call of conscience to go to the  “Nation” will now haunt all Chief Justices. Informed criticism has some impact on judicial dispositions. But the ultimate guarantee of fairness as justice lie with the Justices themselves. As Eugene Ehrlich, a founder of European sociology of law, said: “The best guarantee of justice lies in the personality of the judge.” Justices must be seen practising what they preach to the other holders of public power. It is only when they collectively fail to do so that a democracy is truly imperilled.
Question: 1

Consider the following statements:
1. CJI is the boss of High Court Judges 
2. CJI is superior to other Judges of the Supreme Court 
3. CJI and other four members of Collegium for appointment of Judges in Supreme Court are equal 
4. Chief Justice is one amongst equals and vested with many administrative powers.
Which of the statement given above is / are correct?

Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
  • 1 and 3 only
  • 2 and 3 only
  • 3 only
  • 1, 2, and 4 only
Show Solution

The Correct Option is C

Solution and Explanation

The underlying idea to hold onto here is that the CJI is first among equals, administratively distinct but not judicially superior, and testing each numbered statement against that idea sorts out the answer quickly.

  1. High Court judges: they function independently of the CJI of the Supreme Court, so calling the CJI their boss does not hold.
  2. Other Supreme Court judges: the CJI does not outrank them in adjudicatory authority, only holds a distinct administrative role, so calling the CJI superior overstates the position.
  3. The collegium: the CJI is one of five senior-most judges deciding appointments together, which is precisely a relationship of equality among its members.

That equality within the collegium is the one proposition that survives scrutiny cleanly, which is why Option C, 3 only, is correct.

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Question: 2

Which of the statement given above is / are correct?

Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
  • 1 and 3 only
  • 1 and 2 only
  • 3 only
  • 1, 2 and 3
Show Solution

The Correct Option is D

Solution and Explanation

With multi-statement combination questions like this, the reliable shortcut is to first mark each numbered statement true or false on its own, then see which answer choice matches that set exactly.

  1. Testing narrower combinations first: 1 and 3 only, 1 and 2 only, and 3 only would each be correct only if one or more of statements 1, 2, or 3 were actually false, but none of them is.
  2. Testing the full combination: since statements 1, 2 and 3 are each independently sound, the combination that includes all three, and excludes nothing, is the one that fits.

That makes Option D, 1, 2 and 3, the correct choice.

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Question: 3

Consider the following statements:
1. The Constitution does not make CJI the “Master of Roster”
2. The Supreme Court Rules vests in CJI the power of the “Master of Roster” 
3. The Constitution of India read with Supreme Court Rules vests in CJI the Power of the  “Master of Rolls”
 4. The Power is neither given by the Constitution not by the Supreme Court Rules. It‘s just a convention. 
Which of the statement given above is / are correct?

Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
  • 1 and 3 only
  • 2 only
  • 3 and 4 only
  • 1, 3 only
Show Solution

The Correct Option is B

Solution and Explanation

A good way into this question is to notice that Statement 3 swaps in the wrong term altogether, Master of Rolls is an English judicial office, not the same thing as Master of Roster, so that statement fails on wording before the substance is even considered.

  1. Eliminating Statement 3: the mismatch in terminology rules it out immediately, regardless of whether the rest of the statement sounds plausible.
  2. Weighing Statements 1 and 4 against Statement 2: saying the Constitution alone does not create this power is accurate but incomplete, and saying it is just a convention with no rule-based anchor goes too far the other way, since the Supreme Court Rules do supply a specific procedural basis for the CJI's authority over case allocation.
  3. Landing on Statement 2: it is the one statement that correctly and precisely locates the source of the Master of Roster power in the Supreme Court Rules.

That precision is why the correct answer is Option B, 2 only.

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Question: 4

Consider the following statements:
1) A judge of Supreme Court can be removed from his office by the Parliament. 
2) A judge of Supreme Court can be impeached from his office by the President on the recommendation of Chief Justice of India. 
3) The removal of Supreme Court judge is based on two grounds - proved misbehaviour or incapacity to act. 
Which of the statement given above is / are correct?

Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
  • 1 and 2 only
  • 2 and 3 only
  • 3 only
  • 1, 2 and 3
Show Solution

The Correct Option is C

Solution and Explanation

Article 124(4) sets out a specific two-step removal process, and most wrong statements on this topic go wrong by mixing up who does what within that process.

  1. Who actually removes the judge: Parliament adopts an address by special majority, but the President is the one who then removes the judge by order, so crediting Parliament alone with the removal is inaccurate.
  2. Whether the CJI recommends removal: no such recommendation role for the CJI exists in this constitutional process, so any statement inserting one is incorrect.
  3. The actual grounds: the Constitution confines removal to proved misbehaviour or incapacity, a closed, two-ground standard, which is exactly what the surviving statement describes.

Because only the grounds-based statement matches the constitutional text, Option C, 3 only, is the correct answer.

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Question: 5

Accountability makes the exercise of power more efficient and effective. The ancient Greek historian Herodotus said: "The Greeks though free [were] not absolutely free; they [had] a master called the law." Which of the following statement correctly describes the law?

Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
  • CJI as Master of Rolls is not bound by any law.
  • CJI is bound by the conventions mentioned in the passage above
  • CJI in his administrative capacity is bound by law.
  • CJI as Master of Roster must act fairly, justly and in non-arbitrary manner
Show Solution

The Correct Option is D

Solution and Explanation

  1. (A): Wrong label to begin with, the CJI's case-allocation authority is called "Master of Roster," not "Master of Rolls," and claiming he faces no legal restraint is the opposite of what the passage says.
  2. (B): The passage is about being ruled by law, not by informal conventions, so this substitutes the wrong kind of constraint.
  3. (C): Accurate but incomplete, it covers only the administrative side of the CJI's functioning and leaves out the roster power altogether.
  4. (D): Connects the Herodotus idea to the actual power in issue, the roster power exists, but like all power under the rule of law it must be used fairly, justly and without arbitrariness.

The statement that correctly fits the passage is (D).

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Question: 6

Supreme Court Rules framed under Article 145 of the Constitution provide CJI as the Master of Rolls. These rules

Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
  • Cannot be challenged as per Justice Dinakaran Judgment
  • Can be challenged before the President of India who is the appointing authority of CJI and other Judges
  • Rules made by the Court violative of Fundamental Rights may be struck down as ultra vires the Constitution as per Prem Chand Garg (1963) judgment of the Supreme Court.
  • Supreme Court is supreme and no authority can question it.
Show Solution

The Correct Option is C

Solution and Explanation

  1. (A): No judgment gives Supreme Court rules blanket immunity from challenge, so this overstates the position.
  2. (B): The President's role is limited to appointments, not adjudicating on the validity of Article 145 rules, so this points to the wrong forum.
  3. (C): Correct, Article 145 rules are subordinate to the Constitution, and Prem Chand Garg (1963) confirms that rules infringing Fundamental Rights can be struck down as ultra vires.
  4. (D): Treating the Court as beyond question contradicts the idea that the Constitution, not any one institution, is supreme.

The correct option is (C), rules of the Court that violate Fundamental Rights can be struck down as ultra vires under Prem Chand Garg.

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Question: 7

In S. P. Gupta v. Union of India, it was held that the word ‗Consultation‘ means:

Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
  • Discussion
  • Ascertainment of opinion
  • Concurrence
  • Advice
Show Solution

The Correct Option is B

Solution and Explanation

  1. (A): "Discussion" is too casual a word for what the judgment demanded, an effective exchange of views is more than a mere talk.
  2. (B): This is the actual holding, consultation means genuinely ascertaining the opinion of those consulted through full and effective exchange.
  3. (C): Rejected by the Court itself, concurrence would make the opinion binding, which S. P. Gupta specifically declined to hold.
  4. (D): "Advice" understates the requirement, since mere advice can be disregarded without any real engagement, while the Court demanded genuine ascertainment of opinion.

The word "consultation" was held to mean (B) ascertainment of opinion.

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Question: 8

Per Incuriam means:

Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
  • Judgment given against law
  • Judgment given contrary to people‘s conscience
  • Judgment given contrary to natural law
  • All of the above
Show Solution

The Correct Option is A

Solution and Explanation

  1. (A): Matches the doctrine, per incuriam describes a decision rendered without due care, typically in ignorance of a binding statute or precedent, so it stands against the law that should have applied.
  2. (B): Confuses per incuriam with public opinion, the doctrine has no connection to conscience.
  3. (C): Confuses it with natural law philosophy, again unrelated to the technical, precedent-based meaning of the term.
  4. (D): Cannot be right once (B) and (C) are ruled out individually.

Per incuriam means (A) judgment given against law.

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Question: 9

In which of the following cases, Supreme Court held that "Chief Justice is an institution himself"?

Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
  • Kamini Jaiswal v. Union of India
  • Asok Pande v. Union of India
  • S.P. Gupta v. Union of India
  • Prashant Bhushan v. Union of India
Show Solution

The Correct Option is B

Solution and Explanation

  1. (A): Kamini Jaiswal's case touches the roster power but is not the source of this exact phrase.
  2. (B): Asok Pande v. Union of India is where the Court described the CJI as an institution in himself, tying the observation to the constitutional character of the office rather than the individual.
  3. (C): S. P. Gupta is about the meaning of consultation in appointments, a different question altogether.
  4. (D): Prashant Bhushan's case involves other issues of judicial administration and contempt, not this characterisation.

The case is (B) Asok Pande v. Union of India.

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Question: 10

In which of the following cases, Chief Justice was held to be as "Master of Roster", who alone has prerogative to constitute bench?

Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
  • Prakash Chandra v. Union of India (UOI) through Secretary to the Government of India
  • S P Gupta v. Union of India
  • Third Judges Case
  • Justice C. S. Karnan v. The Hon‘ble Supreme Court of India
Show Solution

The Correct Option is A

Solution and Explanation

  1. (A): This is the case establishing the CJI's exclusive prerogative, as Master of Roster, to constitute Benches, no other judge can do so unilaterally.
  2. (B): S. P. Gupta concerns consultation in appointments, an unrelated question.
  3. (C): The Third Judges Case is about the collegium and appointment/transfer of judges, not Bench formation.
  4. (D): Justice C. S. Karnan's case is a contempt matter and does not lay down this foundational rule.

The correct case is (A) Prakash Chandra v. Union of India (UOI) through Secretary to the Government of India.

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Top Questions on Constitutional Laws

Questions Asked in CLAT PG exam

An unpleasant tussle ensured between the TATA Sons and Cyrus Pallonji Mistry (“CPM”) in October 2016, when Mistry, who was the sixth chairman of Tata Sons, was ousted from the position of Executive Chairman of Tata Sons Limited. CPM took over as the chairman in 2012 after Ratan Tata announced his retirement. Tata Group patriarch Ratan Tata had personally asked Cyrus Mistry to resign as chairman of Tata Sons as the board had lost faith in him, but his refusal led to the removal via majority vote. Cyrus Investments Private limited and Sterling Investment Corporation Private Limited belonged to the Shapoorji Palloni Group in which CPM held a controlling interest (about 2% of the issued share capital of Tata Sons). Seven out of the nine directors of Tata Sons voted for CPM’s replacement after Farida Khambata abstained and Mistry was declared ineligible to vote as he was an interested director. Mistry challenged his removal, accusing the board of mismanagement and of oppressing minority shareholders. however, the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) rejected his petition. After this Mistry challenged his removal in National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). In 2018, NCLAT order restored Mistry as the group’s executive chairman. Tata Sons challenged that NCLAT order in Supreme Court. CPM also challenged the order for few more relief. Supreme Court stayed NCLAT’s order reinstating Cyrus Mistry as the executive chairman of Tata Sons and restoring his directorships in the holding company as well as three group companies, with a preliminary observation that the first impression of the order was “not good” and that the tribunal ‘could’ not have given consequential relief that had not been sought in the first place. Ultimately, the Supreme Court decided the case in favour of Tata Sons. One of the issues decided by Supreme Court was that “whether the case was fit to be qualified as a situation of ‘Oppression and Mismanagement’ under Section 241 of the Companies Act, 2013?”. On this issue, the Supreme Court observed that “unless the removal of a person as a chairman of a company is oppressive or mismanaged or done in a prejudicial manner damaging the interests of the company, its members or the public at large, the NCLT cannot interfere with the removal of a person as a Chairman of a Company in a petition under Section 241 of the Companies Act, 2013.” This case highlighted the point that “an executive chairman does not have sovereign authority over the company. In corporate democracy, decision making always remains with the Board as long as they enjoy the pleasure of the shareholders. Likewise, an executive chairman will continue as long as he/she enjoys the pleasure of the Board. An assumption by the executive chairman that he/she would have a free hand in running the affairs of the company is incongruous to corporate governance and corporate democracy. The Tribunal held that the concept of ‘free hand rule’ is antithesis to collective responsibility and collective decision making”.
[Based on Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. v. Cyrus Investment Pvt. Ltd., 2021 SCC 122].
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Alastair Hudson in his book ‘Securities Law’ First Edition (Sweet & Maxwell), 2008 at page 342, refers to ‘Restricted Offers’ and noticed that there is no contravention of Section 85 of FSMA 2000, if: “(b) the offer is made to or directed at fewer than 100 persons, other than qualified investors, per EEA State”. The purpose underlying that exemption, the author says, is mainly the fact that the offer is not being made to an appreciable section of “the public” such that the policy of the prospectus rules generally is not affected. Further, the author says that “Self-evidently, while an offer to 99 ordinary members of the public would be within the literal terms of the exemption, it would not be the sort of activity anticipated by the legislation. Moreover, if a marketing campaign were arranged such that ordinary members of the people were approached in groups of 99 people at a time in an effort to avoid the prospectus rules, then that would not appear to be within the spirit of the regulations and might be held to contravene the core principle that a regulated person must act with integrity.”
I may, therefore, indicate, subject to what has been stated above, in India that any share or debenture issue beyond forty-nine persons, would be a public issue attracting all the relevant provisions of the SEBI Act, regulations framed thereunder, the Companies Act, pertaining to the public issue. Facts clearly reveal that Saharas have issued securities to the public more than the threshold limit statutorily fixed under the first proviso to Section 67(3) and hence violated the listing provisions which may attract civil and criminal liabilities. Principles of listing, which I may later on discuss, is intended to assist public companies in identifying their obligations and responsibilities, which are continuing in nature, transparent in content and call for high degree of integrity. Obligations are imposed on the issuer on an ongoing basis. Public companies who are legally obliged to list their securities are deemed to accept the continuing obligations, by virtue of their application, prospectus and the subsequent maintenance of listing on a recognized stock exchange. Disclosure is the rule, there is no exception. Misleading public is a serious crime, which may attract civil and criminal liability. Listing of securities depends not upon one’s volition, but on statutory mandate.
[Extract from Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited v. Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), Para 89-91, Civil Appeal No. 9833/2011 (SC)]
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The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words, they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past, it was thought that it included just two rules namely: (1) no one shall be a judge in his own case (Nemo debet esse judex propria causa) and (2) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem).
Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice. Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is not questioned.
If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi-judicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry as observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala [Civil Appeal No. 990/68, decided on 15-07- 1968], the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case.
[Extract from the judgment of the Supreme Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262, decided on April 29, 1969, hereafter ‘A.K. Kraipak’].
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The doctrine of promissory estoppel is by now well recognized and well defined by a catena of decisions of this Court. Where the Government makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promise and, in fact, the promise, acting in reliance on it, alters his position, the Government would be held bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Government at the instance of the promise notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 229 of the Constitution. The rule of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine has to be moulded to suit the particular situation. It is not a hard-and-fast rule but an elastic one, the objective of which is to do justice between the parties and to extend an equitable treatment to them. This doctrine is a principle evolved by equity, to avoid injustice and though commonly named promissory estoppel, it is neither in the realm of contract nor in the realm of estoppel. For application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel the promise must establish that he suffered in detriment or altered his position by reliance on the promise.
Normally, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is being applied against the Government and defence based on executive necessity would not be accepted by the court. However, if it can be shown by the Government that having regard to the facts as they have subsequently transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government to the promise made by it, the court would not raise an equity in favour of the promise and enforce the promise against the Government. Where public interest warrants, the principles of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked. The Government can change the policy in public interest. However, it is well settled that taking cue from this doctrine, the authority cannot be compelled to do something which is not allowed by law or prohibited by law. There is no promissory estoppel against the settled proposition of law. Doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked for enforcement of a promise made contrary to law, because none can be compelled to act against the statute. Thus, the Government or public authority cannot be compelled to make a provision which is contrary to law.
[Extract from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shree Sidhbali Steels Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2011) 3 SCC 193, decided on January 20, 2011, hereafter ‘Shree Sidhbali Steels’].
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