Question

The name of which of the following judgments has been replaced by '[1]‘ in the passageabove?

• A. Rukia Khatun v. Abdul Khalique Laskar
• B. Shamim Ara v. State of UP and Another
• C. Fuzlunbi v. K Khader Vali and Another
• D. Mohd. Ahmad Khan v. Shah Bano Begum
• A. The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937
• B. Special Marriage Act of 1872
• C. The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986
• D. The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019
• A. 1& 2 are correct
• B. 1, 2 & 3 are correct
• C. 1, 2 & 4 are correct
• D. All are correct
• A. Only 1
• B. 1 and 2
• C. 3 and 4
• D. 1, 2 and 3
• A. State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali
• B. Mohd. Ahmad Khan v. Shah Bano Begum
• C. Daniel Latifi v. Union of India
• D. Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India
• A. Issues of law which have not been decided or untouched by dictum or decision.
• B. Issues of law which have been settled by court
• C. Issues of law where so many inconsistent decisions are present
• D. Issues of law which should be resolved by the legislature and not by the court
• A. Harvinder Kaur v Harmender Singh Chaudhry
• B. Maneka Gandhi v. Indira Nehru Gandhi
• C. T. Saritha v. Union of India
• D. Prakash v. Phulwati
• A. Only 1
• B. 1 and 2 only
• C. 2, 3 and 4.
• D. 1 and 3 only
• A. Khula is the right of a woman in Islam to divorce and it means separation from her husband
• B. Khula is the right of a man in Islam to divorce and it means separation from his wife
• C. Khula is 'obtaining release from each other‘.
• D. Khula is a form of Talaq practiced in Shia community
• A. Muslim women cannot get divorce on the grounds of cruelty
• B. Hindu woman can get divorce on the conversion to any religion by her husband.Conversion by itself shall not dissolve marriage of Muslim woman but she can obtaindivorce on other grounds after conversion such as cruelty, impotency, disappearance etc.
• C. Hindu woman can get divorce on the non -payment of maintenance for two years
• D. All the above

Answer 1

The Correct Option is B

The blank in the passage needs a case that indirectly found triple talaq invalid before the issue was decided outright, so each option can be tested against that description.

1. Rukia Khatun: A High Court ruling on reconciliation requirements, not the Supreme Court holding the passage refers to.
2. Shamim Ara: A Supreme Court ruling that effectively required proof and communication of a valid talaq, undercutting unilateral triple talaq without saying so in as many words.
3. Fuzlunbi: Concerned with maintenance after divorce, not the validity of triple talaq.
4. Mohd. Ahmad Khan v. Shah Bano Begum: A maintenance case that prompted later legislation, not a ruling on triple talaq's validity.

Because Shamim Ara is the only one of the four that undercuts triple talaq's validity in substance, Shamim Ara v. State of UP and Another is the correct answer.

Answer 2

Matching the quoted Section 2 text to its source statute means checking which Act actually applies Muslim Personal Law across this broad list of subjects.

1. Shariat Application Act, 1937: Its own Section 2 covers intestate succession, marriage, talaq, dower and guardianship in the same terms quoted in the passage.
2. Special Marriage Act, 1872: Provides a civil alternative to personal law rather than applying personal law, the reverse of what the quote does.
3. Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986: Limited to maintenance after divorce, far narrower than the quoted list.
4. Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019: Deals only with criminalising triple talaq, not a general application-of-personal-law clause.

Since the quoted text is the operative clause of the 1937 Act, The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 is the correct answer.

Answer 3

Checking the four statements against the actual Shayara Bano bench composition and reasoning sorts out which are accurate.

1. Statement 1: Accurately reflects the Khehar-Nazeer dissent, which found the practice objectionable but outside judicial power to strike down.
2. Statement 2: Accurately reflects the 3-2 split and the dissent's proposed six month injunction with a call to the legislature.
3. Statement 3: Accurately reflects the majority's two grounds, arbitrariness from two judges and an unislamic finding from the third.
4. Statement 4: Inaccurate, since the third majority judge was Justice Kurian Joseph and not Justice D. Y. Chandrachud, who was not part of this bench.

Since only the fourth statement misnames a judge, 1, 2 & 3 are correct is the correct answer.

Answer 4

Comparing each statement to the settled classical definitions of the talaq forms narrows down which single one is wrong.

1. Statement 1, Ahsan: Wrongly describes it as three pronouncements, when Ahsan is properly a single pronouncement followed by abstinence through iddat.
2. Statement 2, Hasan: Correctly describes three pronouncements across three successive tuhrs.
3. Statement 3, Biddat variant one: Correctly describes three pronouncements made in a single tuhr.
4. Statement 4, Biddat variant two: Correctly describes a single irrevocable pronouncement.

Since statement 1 alone misdescribes its form, Only 1 is the correct answer as the one that is not correctly matched.

Answer 5

Each case can be tested against whether it actually addresses the immunity of personal law from fundamental rights review.

1. Narasu Appa Mali: Directly holds personal law is not "law in force" under Article 13 and so cannot be struck down on fundamental rights grounds.
2. Shah Bano: About maintenance under a secular criminal provision, not about personal law's constitutional status.
3. Daniel Latifi: Interprets a statute consistently with Article 21, the opposite of holding personal law immune.
4. Sarla Mudgal: About conversion used to bypass bigamy law, unrelated to this proposition.

Since only the first case lays down this specific rule, State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali is the correct answer.

Answer 6

The Latin phrase can be pinned down by checking each option against its literal meaning and against how the passage uses it.

1. Undecided, untouched issue: Matches the literal sense of res integra as a matter with no prior ruling on it.
2. Settled by court: Describes the opposite state, which is what a matter becomes once it stops being res integra.
3. Inconsistent decisions: A different problem, conflicting precedent, not the absence of precedent.
4. For the legislature, not the court: An unrelated separation-of-powers concept.

Since the passage's own phrase "no more res integra" implies the issue previously had no ruling on it, Issues of law which have not been decided or untouched by dictum or decision is the correct answer.

Answer 7

The source of this specific quotation can be identified by matching its content, rejecting constitutional scrutiny of marriage, to the case that actually took that position.

1. Harvinder Kaur: The Delhi High Court used exactly this reasoning and metaphor to uphold restitution of conjugal rights against an Article 21 and 14 challenge.
2. Maneka Gandhi v. Indira Nehru Gandhi: An unrelated case despite the similar name.
3. T. Saritha: Took the opposite view, striking down the same provision as unconstitutional.
4. Prakash v. Phulwati: Concerns coparcenary succession rights, a different area of law entirely.

Since the reasoning and language belong to the Delhi High Court's ruling, Harvinder Kaur v Harmender Singh Chaudhry is the correct answer.

Answer 8

Checking each statement against the actual text of the Hindu Marriage Act and the Special Marriage Act narrows down which pair holds up.

1. Statement 1: Correct, since the Act codifies rather than displaces Hindu personal law on marriage.
2. Statement 2: Incorrect, and contradicts statement 1 outright.
3. Statement 3: Correct, matching Section 21A of the Special Marriage Act on succession for Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain spouses.
4. Statement 4: Incorrect, since widow remarriage was already recognised under an 1856 statute long before 1955.

With statements 1 and 3 holding up and 2 and 4 failing, 1 and 3 only is the correct answer.

Answer 9

Working through the options by checking who holds the right and what khula actually achieves settles the meaning of the term.

1. Wife's right to separation: Correctly identifies khula as wife-initiated divorce.
2. Husband's right to separation: Reverses the roles; a husband ending the marriage unilaterally is talaq, not khula.
3. Obtaining release from each other: Too general, since it loses the specific detail that the wife is the one initiating the release.
4. A form of Talaq in the Shia community: Incorrect, since khula is not a talaq variant and is not community-specific.

Since only the first option correctly attributes the right to the wife and states its effect, Khula is the right of a woman in Islam to divorce and it means separation from her husband is the correct answer.

Answer 10

Two personal law statutes are in play here, the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, and the statement that mixes them up correctly is the one to identify.

1. Muslim women and cruelty: False. Cruelty is a recognised statutory ground for a Muslim wife's divorce petition under the 1939 Act, so a blanket claim that she cannot rely on it is wrong.
2. Conversion and divorce: True. Hindu law treats the spouse's conversion out of Hinduism as a standalone ground for divorce, no additional misconduct needs to be shown. Muslim law treats conversion differently, it does not automatically end the marriage, but the wife can still divorce on separate grounds like cruelty or impotency once conversion has occurred.
3. Non-payment of maintenance for two years: False as framed. This is a ground under Muslim personal law for the wife, not a Hindu Marriage Act ground, so pinning it on a Hindu woman is inaccurate.
4. All of the above: Cannot hold once two of the three statements are shown to be wrong.

The correct answer is Hindu woman can get divorce on the conversion to any religion by her husband; conversion alone does not dissolve a Muslim woman's marriage, but she can still obtain divorce on other grounds such as cruelty, impotency, or disappearance.