Question

The above passage is from which of the following judgments?

• A. The above passage is from which of the following judgments?
• B. Justice K. S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2017) 1 SCC 10.
• C. Justice K. S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.
• D. Justice K. S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2018) 1 SCC 10.
• A. Right to Privacy of an individual, being part of the Right to Life.
• B. The extent and scope of the ‗ordered liberty‘ as a tenet of liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution
• C. Right to Life of an individual apart from mere animal existence.
• D. All of the above
• A. Justice Rowland.
• B. Justice Holmes.
• C. Lord Justice A.W. Semens.
• D. Justice Blackburn
• A. harak Singh v. State of U.P.
• B. M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra
• C. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India
• D. Rustom Cavasji Cooper v. Union of India
• A. The destruction by the State of a sanctified personal space, of body and mind is violative of the guarantee against arbitrary state action
• B. The intersection between one‘s mental integrity and privacy entitles the individual to the freedom of self-determination.
• C. The privacy of an individual recognises an inviolable right to determine how freedom shall be exercised.
• D. The guarantee of privacy is a guarantee against the arbitrary State action
• A. The Right to Privacy cannot be denied, even if there is a miniscule fraction of the population which is affected.
• B. The majoritarian concept applies to the Constitutional Rights and the Courts must adhere to the majoritarian view.
• C. One‘s sexual orientation is undoubtedly not an attribute of privacy.
• D. Right to Privacy is an unrestricted and inviolable right, outside the fetters of any State action.
• A. Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India.
• B. Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India.
• C. NALSA v. Union of India
• D. Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Fundation.
• A. Right to Privacy
• B. Informational/Data Privacy
• C. The Aadhaar Act, 2016.
• D. None of the above.
• A. Right to Die with Dignity
• B. Right to Live with Dignity
• C. Freedom of Sexual Orientation
• D. Right to Reputation
• A. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud
• B. Justice Dipak Misra
• C. Justice R. F. Nariman
• D. Justice Jasti Chelameshwar

Answer 1

The Correct Option is C

Citation questions like this one are best solved by checking year, volume, and page separately rather than reading the citations as a whole.

1. Option (A): Not a real option since it just restates the question, so it cannot supply a citation.
2. Option (B): Gets the year right (2017) but the volume wrong, volume 1 is not where this judgment appears.
3. Option (C): Gets the year, volume, and starting page all correct, this is the standard citation, (2017) 10 SCC 1, used for the privacy judgment.
4. Option (D): Gets the volume and page right but the year wrong, the decision was delivered in 2017, not 2018.

Only option (C) has all three elements, year, volume, and page, correct at once, so it is the answer.

Answer 2

Instead of picking one statement, check whether each proposition is consistent with the passage, since "all of the above" is only correct if none of the individual statements can be ruled out.

1. Option (A): Consistent with the passage, since it treats intrusion into the home as a violation of a right that sits within the broader right to life.
2. Option (B): Consistent, the passage uses the exact phrase "ordered liberty" to describe the right being protected.
3. Option (C): Consistent, the passage's insistence that the home is not merely property tracks the idea that life under Article 21 is more than bare existence.
4. Option (D): Since A, B, and C are all separately true of the passage, the combined option must be the correct choice.

As none of the first three statements can be eliminated, the comprehensive option (D) is correct.

Answer 3

The safest way through this option set is to eliminate names that have no real connection to the sanctity-of-the-home maxim before settling on the remaining one.

1. Option (A): Justice Rowland has no established link to this maxim or to Semayne's Case in the material Indian courts rely on.
2. Option (B): Justice Holmes is the name most closely tied, in the comparative jurisprudence Indian courts cite, to writings on personal liberty and privacy that accompany discussion of maxims like this one.
3. Option (C): Lord Justice A.W. Semens is not a genuine authority, the name appears designed to be confused with Semayne, the case itself.
4. Option (D): Justice Blackburn does not feature in the privacy line of cases that reference this particular maxim.

With three of the four names ruled out as unconnected or fabricated, option (B), Justice Holmes, is the one that fits.

Answer 4

The maxim in question is about protecting the home from arbitrary police intrusion, so the right case to pick is the one that actually deals with police entering a person's residence.

1. Option (A): Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. is precisely about police surveillance and domiciliary visits at a person's home, matching the subject of the maxim directly.
2. Option (B): M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra is about search of documents and actually declined to import an American-style protection against searches, so it does not champion this maxim.
3. Option (C): Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India concerns passport impoundment and due process, unrelated to home searches.
4. Option (D): Rustom Cavasji Cooper v. Union of India is a property and bank nationalisation case, with no link to domiciliary intrusion.

Since only Kharak Singh addresses the sanctity of the home against police entry, it is the correct choice.

Answer 5

Puttaswamy built privacy as an important but qualified right, so the quickest check here is to see which option treats it as absolute, since that is the one the judgment does not support.

1. Option (A): Matches the judgment's link between personal space and protection from arbitrary state action.
2. Option (B): Matches the judgment's reasoning connecting mental integrity to self-determination.
3. Option (C): Describes privacy as inviolable, but the Court held privacy can be restricted through a law meeting the legality, need, and proportionality tests, so calling it inviolable is inconsistent with the actual holding.
4. Option (D): Matches the Court's framing of privacy as protection against arbitrary state action.

Because C alone treats privacy as absolute when the judgment does not, C is the statement that is not an accurate interpretation.

Answer 6

Three of the four options describe privacy in ways the judgment specifically rejects, so elimination by checking each against the Court's actual position works well here.

1. Option (A): Correct, this "miniscule minority" reasoning is a recurring theme in the judgment used to protect groups like sexual minorities from majoritarian denial of rights.
2. Option (B): Incorrect, the Court rejected majoritarian control over constitutional rights rather than endorsing it.
3. Option (C): Incorrect, the judgment affirmatively includes sexual orientation within privacy, the opposite of what this option claims.
4. Option (D): Incorrect, privacy was held to be a qualified right subject to reasonable, proportionate restriction, not an unrestricted one.

Since only option (A) matches what the Court actually said about the scope of privacy, it is the correct answer.

Answer 7

The chronology of these cases helps pin down the source: Koushal (2013) criminalised, Puttaswamy (2017) laid the privacy foundation and criticised Koushal, and Navtej Singh Johar (2018) formally struck down Section 377 relying on Puttaswamy.

1. Option (A): Correct, this dignity and equality language on sexual orientation as a privacy attribute appears in the Puttaswamy opinions themselves, ahead of the formal Section 377 reading-down.
2. Option (B): Navtej Singh Johar came later and applied this reasoning to strike down Section 377, but the passage's specific wording traces to Puttaswamy.
3. Option (C): NALSA is about transgender identity, a different question from sexual orientation.
4. Option (D): Koushal took the opposite view, upholding criminalisation, so it cannot be the source of this passage.

Given the timeline and the substance, option (A), Puttaswamy, is the correct source.

Answer 8

The key words to focus on are "information silos" and "in aggregation," since these point to a specific facet of privacy rather than the right as a whole.

1. Option (A): Too general, privacy covers many facets beyond data aggregation, so it does not capture the precise idea in the passage.
2. Option (B): Correct, the passage is describing how individually harmless data points combine to reveal a person's full profile, which is exactly what informational or data privacy is concerned with.
3. Option (C): The Aadhaar Act is one statute dealing with one identity system, while the passage describes a general principle applicable well beyond Aadhaar.
4. Option (D): Ruled out because option B is a clear fit.

The passage is a description of informational or data privacy, making option (B) correct.

Answer 9

The trick in this question is to notice that three of the four rights are consistently grouped together in the dignity-based reading of Article 21, while the fourth comes from a separate line of cases.

1. Option (A): Right to die with dignity is grouped with the dignity strand of Article 21 through the passive euthanasia decision.
2. Option (B): Right to live with dignity is the foundational tenet from which the expanded meaning of "Life" grew after Maneka Gandhi.
3. Option (C): Freedom of sexual orientation was brought into this same dignity strand through the privacy judgment and the decriminalisation decision that followed.
4. Option (D): Right to reputation is protected through a separate set of cases dealing with defamation and fair procedure, and is not one of the tenets listed together with the other three in this expanded dignity reading.

Since A, B, and C form one consistent group and D stands apart, D is the tenet that does not belong with the others.

Answer 10

Puttaswamy produced six opinions, and each judge emphasised a different facet of privacy, so this is really a matching exercise between judge and theme.

1. Option (A): Chandrachud J. is associated with informational privacy and data silos, not specifically food choice.
2. Option (B): Dipak Misra J.'s opinion is remembered for the doctrinal history of reading privacy into Article 21, not for the food-preference illustration.
3. Option (C): Nariman J.'s opinion covers multiple dimensions of privacy broadly but is not the one specifically tied to dietary choice.
4. Option (D): Chelameshwar J. is the judge whose opinion is specifically associated with protecting lifestyle autonomy, including what a person chooses to eat, as part of privacy.

Matching the theme of food preference to the judge known for that emphasis points to option (D), Justice Jasti Chelameshwar.