Comprehension
Vivian Bose, J., had observed that Section 106 of the Evidence Act is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible for the prosecution to establish certain facts which are particularly within the knowledge of the accused. In Shambu Nath Mehra vs. The State of Ajmer (1956 SCR 199) the learned Judge has stated the legal principle thus: “This lays down the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and section 106 is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult for the prosecution to establish facts which are ‘especially’ within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. The word ‘especially’ underscores facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within the knowledge of the accused. It added, if the section were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead to the very startling conclusion that in a murder case the burden lies on the accused to prove that he did not commit the murder because who could know better than him whether he did or did not.” It is evident that it cannot be the intention and Privy Council has twice refused to construe this section, as reproduced in certain other Acts outside India, to mean that the burden lies on the accused person to show that he did not commit the crime for which he is tried. These cases are Attygalle v. the King. 1936 PC 169 (AIR V 23) (A) and Seneviratne v. R, 1936-3 All ER 36 at p.49 (B). In case resting on circumstantial evidence, an accused person’s failure to provide a reasonable explanation as required by S. 106 could serve as an additional link in the chain of circumstances.
(Based on facts from State of West Bengal vs. Mir Mohammad Omar & Ors, AIR 2000SUPREME COURT 2988)
Question: 1

Under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, in cases where the burden of proof lies on the prosecution, which of the following accurately reflects the relationship between Section 101 and 106 of IEA, 1872?

Updated On: Jan 13, 2026
  • Section 106 is an exception to Section 101
  • Section 106 is intended to relieve the prosecution of their duty to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt under Section 101
  • Both A and B
  • Neither A nor B
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The Correct Option is A

Solution and Explanation

To determine the relationship between Sections 101 and 106 of the Indian Evidence Act (IEA) of 1872, consider their legal framework. Section 101 of the IEA states the prosecution must prove an accused's guilt in criminal cases. Section 106 serves as an exception. It applies when the accused exclusively knows certain facts, making prosecution proof difficult. This prevents requiring the prosecution to prove facts solely within the accused's knowledge. Based on legal understanding and Justice Vivian Bose's interpretation, Section 106 is an exception to Section 101, as established in Shambu Nath Mehra vs. The State of Ajmer. Consequently, the correct answer is: Section 106 is an exception to Section 101.
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Question: 2

‘Any person’ in Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act refers to:

Updated On: Jan 13, 2026
  • A party to the suit/proceeding
  • A stranger to the suit/proceeding
  • A witness
  • None of the above
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The Correct Option is A

Solution and Explanation

Indian Evidence Act's Section 106 states that if a fact is uniquely known by someone, they must prove it. This section mainly concerns legal case participants who naturally know specific facts critical to the case. Legally, 'any person' in Section 106 usually means a party to the suit/proceeding.

Court interpretations, like in Shambu Nath Mehra vs. The State of Ajmer, show this section applies when the prosecution struggles to prove a fact known only to the defendant or respondent. The court clarified that while the prosecution typically proves facts, Section 106 helps when proving a fact is excessively difficult because only the accused knows it.

Therefore, 'any person' means those directly involved, not external witnesses or others. Thus, Section 106 correctly applies to those directly involved in the legal matter.

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Question: 3

In which of the recent following cases, Supreme Court expounded the principles relating to the applicability of S. 106 of Indian Evidence Act?

Updated On: Jan 13, 2026
  • Anees v. The State Govt. of NCT, 2024 SC
  • Anita v. NCT of Delhi, 2024 SC
  • Abhay v. Union of India, 2024 SC
  • Anish v. The State Govt. of NCT, 2024 SC
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The Correct Option is A

Solution and Explanation

In the 2024 SC case of Anees v. The State Govt. of NCT, the Supreme Court clarified how Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act applies. This section deals with situations where the prosecution struggles to prove facts known only to the accused. Although the prosecution usually bears the burden of proof in criminal cases, Section 106 provides an exception, particularly in cases using circumstantial evidence. If the accused possesses specific knowledge and fails to provide a reasonable explanation, this can strengthen the prosecution's case. This principle echoes earlier rulings, including Shambu Nath Mehra vs. The State of Ajmer (1956 SCR 199), and aligns with the established understanding that the accused isn't automatically required to prove innocence just because they have special knowledge, as seen in Attygalle v. the King and Seneviratne v. R.
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Question: 4

What is the phrase “Presumptions are like bats, flitting in the twilight but disappearing in the sunshine of facts” indicate?

Updated On: Jan 13, 2026
  • Presumption shifts the burden of proof to the party against whom the presumption operates, but the burden shifts back to the original party once rebutting facts are presented
  • Presumption is a substantive piece of evidence and it completely relieve the prosecution of its burden of proof, as longs as the presumption is established in the beginning of the trial
  • There are different categories of presumptions and the highest degree of presumption shifts the burden of proof permanently to the accused, who must disprove the presumption beyond reasonable doubt
  • Presumptions are irrefutable facts that, once established, cannot be negated by evidence brought forth in the case
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The Correct Option is A

Solution and Explanation

A legal presumption initially assigns the burden of proof. This burden is temporary, shifting back when counter-evidence is presented. Essentially, a presumption guides the initial legal phase, but factual evidence dictates the outcome. Presenting rebutting facts negates the presumption's effect.

The correct interpretation is: "A presumption shifts the burden of proof to the opposing party, but the burden reverts when rebutting facts are introduced."

Legally, this aligns with Section 106 of the Evidence Act, which generally places the burden on the prosecution, except when facts are uniquely known by the accused. As established in Shambu Nath Mehra vs. The State of Ajmer (1956 SCR 199), the burden can shift temporarily with a presumption, requiring the defendant to provide exculpatory evidence, especially in circumstantial cases.

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Question: 5

Which of the theories emanate from Section 106 of Indian Evidence Act?
1. Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitor
2. Theory of reverse burden of proof
3. Doctrine of last seen together
4. Presumption of innocence
Select the correct option:

Updated On: Jan 13, 2026
  • 1 and 2
  • 2 and 3
  • 3 and 4
  • 1 and 4
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The Correct Option is B

Solution and Explanation

Indian Evidence Act Section 106 influences criminal law principles, particularly regarding the burden of proof. This section addresses scenarios where the accused possesses exclusive knowledge of specific facts, making it challenging for the prosecution to prove them. Consequently:
1. Reverse burden of proof: Section 106 implies that the burden of proving facts known exclusively to a person rests on that person. This doesn't require the accused to prove innocence, but rather to provide explanations to address evidentiary gaps.
2. Doctrine of last seen together: This doctrine, linked to circumstantial evidence, places the responsibility on the last person seen with the deceased to explain the events. Section 106 significantly impacts this, especially when the accused claims exclusive knowledge of the situation.
Both theories are derived from Section 106 of the Evidence Act.
Therefore, the correct answer is: 2 and 3.

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An unpleasant tussle ensured between the TATA Sons and Cyrus Pallonji Mistry (“CPM”) in October 2016, when Mistry, who was the sixth chairman of Tata Sons, was ousted from the position of Executive Chairman of Tata Sons Limited. CPM took over as the chairman in 2012 after Ratan Tata announced his retirement. Tata Group patriarch Ratan Tata had personally asked Cyrus Mistry to resign as chairman of Tata Sons as the board had lost faith in him, but his refusal led to the removal via majority vote. Cyrus Investments Private limited and Sterling Investment Corporation Private Limited belonged to the Shapoorji Palloni Group in which CPM held a controlling interest (about 2% of the issued share capital of Tata Sons). Seven out of the nine directors of Tata Sons voted for CPM’s replacement after Farida Khambata abstained and Mistry was declared ineligible to vote as he was an interested director. Mistry challenged his removal, accusing the board of mismanagement and of oppressing minority shareholders. however, the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) rejected his petition. After this Mistry challenged his removal in National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). In 2018, NCLAT order restored Mistry as the group’s executive chairman. Tata Sons challenged that NCLAT order in Supreme Court. CPM also challenged the order for few more relief. Supreme Court stayed NCLAT’s order reinstating Cyrus Mistry as the executive chairman of Tata Sons and restoring his directorships in the holding company as well as three group companies, with a preliminary observation that the first impression of the order was “not good” and that the tribunal ‘could’ not have given consequential relief that had not been sought in the first place. Ultimately, the Supreme Court decided the case in favour of Tata Sons. One of the issues decided by Supreme Court was that “whether the case was fit to be qualified as a situation of ‘Oppression and Mismanagement’ under Section 241 of the Companies Act, 2013?”. On this issue, the Supreme Court observed that “unless the removal of a person as a chairman of a company is oppressive or mismanaged or done in a prejudicial manner damaging the interests of the company, its members or the public at large, the NCLT cannot interfere with the removal of a person as a Chairman of a Company in a petition under Section 241 of the Companies Act, 2013.” This case highlighted the point that “an executive chairman does not have sovereign authority over the company. In corporate democracy, decision making always remains with the Board as long as they enjoy the pleasure of the shareholders. Likewise, an executive chairman will continue as long as he/she enjoys the pleasure of the Board. An assumption by the executive chairman that he/she would have a free hand in running the affairs of the company is incongruous to corporate governance and corporate democracy. The Tribunal held that the concept of ‘free hand rule’ is antithesis to collective responsibility and collective decision making”.
[Based on Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. v. Cyrus Investment Pvt. Ltd., 2021 SCC 122].
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Alastair Hudson in his book ‘Securities Law’ First Edition (Sweet & Maxwell), 2008 at page 342, refers to ‘Restricted Offers’ and noticed that there is no contravention of Section 85 of FSMA 2000, if: “(b) the offer is made to or directed at fewer than 100 persons, other than qualified investors, per EEA State”. The purpose underlying that exemption, the author says, is mainly the fact that the offer is not being made to an appreciable section of “the public” such that the policy of the prospectus rules generally is not affected. Further, the author says that “Self-evidently, while an offer to 99 ordinary members of the public would be within the literal terms of the exemption, it would not be the sort of activity anticipated by the legislation. Moreover, if a marketing campaign were arranged such that ordinary members of the people were approached in groups of 99 people at a time in an effort to avoid the prospectus rules, then that would not appear to be within the spirit of the regulations and might be held to contravene the core principle that a regulated person must act with integrity.”
I may, therefore, indicate, subject to what has been stated above, in India that any share or debenture issue beyond forty-nine persons, would be a public issue attracting all the relevant provisions of the SEBI Act, regulations framed thereunder, the Companies Act, pertaining to the public issue. Facts clearly reveal that Saharas have issued securities to the public more than the threshold limit statutorily fixed under the first proviso to Section 67(3) and hence violated the listing provisions which may attract civil and criminal liabilities. Principles of listing, which I may later on discuss, is intended to assist public companies in identifying their obligations and responsibilities, which are continuing in nature, transparent in content and call for high degree of integrity. Obligations are imposed on the issuer on an ongoing basis. Public companies who are legally obliged to list their securities are deemed to accept the continuing obligations, by virtue of their application, prospectus and the subsequent maintenance of listing on a recognized stock exchange. Disclosure is the rule, there is no exception. Misleading public is a serious crime, which may attract civil and criminal liability. Listing of securities depends not upon one’s volition, but on statutory mandate.
[Extract from Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited v. Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), Para 89-91, Civil Appeal No. 9833/2011 (SC)]
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The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words, they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past, it was thought that it included just two rules namely: (1) no one shall be a judge in his own case (Nemo debet esse judex propria causa) and (2) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem).
Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice. Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is not questioned.
If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi-judicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry as observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala [Civil Appeal No. 990/68, decided on 15-07- 1968], the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case.
[Extract from the judgment of the Supreme Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262, decided on April 29, 1969, hereafter ‘A.K. Kraipak’].
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The doctrine of promissory estoppel is by now well recognized and well defined by a catena of decisions of this Court. Where the Government makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promise and, in fact, the promise, acting in reliance on it, alters his position, the Government would be held bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Government at the instance of the promise notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 229 of the Constitution. The rule of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine has to be moulded to suit the particular situation. It is not a hard-and-fast rule but an elastic one, the objective of which is to do justice between the parties and to extend an equitable treatment to them. This doctrine is a principle evolved by equity, to avoid injustice and though commonly named promissory estoppel, it is neither in the realm of contract nor in the realm of estoppel. For application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel the promise must establish that he suffered in detriment or altered his position by reliance on the promise.
Normally, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is being applied against the Government and defence based on executive necessity would not be accepted by the court. However, if it can be shown by the Government that having regard to the facts as they have subsequently transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government to the promise made by it, the court would not raise an equity in favour of the promise and enforce the promise against the Government. Where public interest warrants, the principles of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked. The Government can change the policy in public interest. However, it is well settled that taking cue from this doctrine, the authority cannot be compelled to do something which is not allowed by law or prohibited by law. There is no promissory estoppel against the settled proposition of law. Doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked for enforcement of a promise made contrary to law, because none can be compelled to act against the statute. Thus, the Government or public authority cannot be compelled to make a provision which is contrary to law.
[Extract from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shree Sidhbali Steels Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2011) 3 SCC 193, decided on January 20, 2011, hereafter ‘Shree Sidhbali Steels’].
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