Question

Habermas is a:

• A. German Philosopher
• B. French Philosopher
• C. Western Social Scientist
• D. English Jurist
• A. Natural law is necessary for a good positive law and they are not identical in content.
• B. Natural law is necessary for a good positive law, and they are identical in content but differ in form.
• C. Natural law is necessary for a good positive law, and they are identical in content but differ in form.
• D. Natural law is necessary for a good positive law but they differ in both form and content.
• A. Culture
• B. Ethics
• C. Morality
• D. None of the above.
• A. Every piece of Law, in order to be valid, must fulfil minimum moral standard comprising of certain procedural requirements like generality, Prospectively promulgation, intelligibility and consistency.
• B. The contents of every law in order to be valid must be mere minimum moral standard without anything more.
• C. The question of morality of every law is a matter for the inner conscience of the legislators and judges have nothing to do with it.
• D. The question of morality of law is not for the courts to determine.
• A. Common Cause v. Union of India (2018)
• B. Bhupinder Singh v. State of H. P (2011)
• C. Kumar v. State of T. N (2013)
• D. Gargi v. State of Haryana (2019)
• A. St. Thomas Aquinas
• B. John Locke
• C. Hobbes
• D. R. Stammler
• A. Habermas
• B. John Locke
• C. Savigny
• D. Lon L. Fuller
• A. Morality
• B. Publication of Laws
• C. Rational Democratic Process
• D. Judicial recognition
• A. It is made as a result of divine providence
• B. It is made as a result of collective positive action
• C. It is made by person in authority
• D. It is followed by everybody
• A. They were running away from the realities of post-industrial Britain.
• B. They were not imagining a perfectly ordered society
• C. They were depicting the state of law and order of contemporary Britain.
• D. None of the above.

Answer 1

The Correct Option is A

Pinning down a thinker's identity is usually a matter of checking nationality first and discipline second, and Habermas passes both checks for only one of the four labels offered.

1. German Philosopher: correct on both counts, he is German by nationality and a philosopher associated with the Frankfurt School by discipline.
2. French Philosopher: fails the nationality check outright.
3. Western Social Scientist: is too generic and sidesteps the more precise and accurate description available.
4. English Jurist: fails on both nationality and discipline.

Since only the German philosopher label matches both his nationality and his field, the correct answer is German Philosopher.

Answer 2

Hobbes's view can be pinned down by asking two separate questions about natural and civil law: do they share the same substance, and do they share the same form of expression.

1. On content: Hobbes treated the substance of natural law and civil law as one and the same, civil law does not add new substantive content beyond what natural law already supplies.
2. On form: what changes is the mode through which that content is made binding, natural law is discovered by reason, while civil law is promulgated and enforced as a command of the sovereign.
3. Options describing a difference in content fail outright, since Hobbes never treated the substance as diverging between the two.
4. The option describing identical content but different form matches Hobbes's tenet exactly, and this is the formulation credited as correct among the choices given.

Since Hobbes held the content of natural and civil law to be the same, differing only in form, the correct answer is identical in content but differ in form.

Answer 3

Filling in a blank inside a passage is best done by tracing the sentence's own logic rather than guessing from the option list first.

1. Culture: is never introduced as a concept in the passage at all, so it has nothing to attach to.
2. Ethics: is a plausible-sounding legal term, but the passage's own sentence structure already names morality as the concept being discussed, so bringing in a different term would break the reference.
3. Morality: the surrounding sentence says law and this term are complementary but not in a hierarchy, and are described as parallel institutions, a description that only stays coherent if the blank repeats the same word used a moment earlier in the passage.
4. None of the above: is unnecessary once a term fits the passage cleanly.

Reading the blank as a continuation of the sentence that precedes it confirms the missing word, so the correct answer is morality.

Answer 4

Fuller's inner morality of law is a checklist of procedural qualities, so the quickest way to sort these options is to ask whether each one is describing procedure, substance, or something else entirely.

1. Procedural requirements like generality, promulgation, intelligibility and consistency: this is exactly Fuller's list of desiderata for legality, and matches his thesis precisely.
2. Minimum moral content of the law's substance: shifts the focus away from procedure to content, which is not what Fuller's inner morality is about.
3. A private matter of legislative conscience beyond judicial concern: Fuller's criteria are objectively checkable, not confined to conscience, so this misreads the theory.
4. Morality of law being outside judicial determination: courts routinely assess exactly these procedural qualities, so this statement runs against how the theory is actually applied.

Since only the procedural checklist description tracks Fuller's actual thesis, the correct answer is the statement describing generality, prospective promulgation, intelligibility and consistency as the minimum procedural standard for valid law.

Answer 5

The quotation is really about method, when a Court builds new law it must first know the existing law, so identifying the case means matching this jurisprudential self-reflection to a decision where the Court was genuinely breaking new ground.

1. Common Cause v. Union of India (2018): is the passive euthanasia and living will decision, a landmark instance of the Supreme Court articulating new legal norms while grounding its reasoning first in the existing analytical position, matching the quotation's description closely.
2. Bhupinder Singh v. State of H.P. (2011): does not concern this kind of jurisprudential groundbreaking discussion.
3. Kumar v. State of T.N. (2013): is similarly unconnected to this specific observation.
4. Gargi v. State of Haryana (2019): also does not match the quoted reasoning.

Since only the Common Cause decision fits the description of a Court developing new legal norms while first anchoring itself in analytical jurisprudence, the correct answer is Common Cause v. Union of India (2018).

Answer 6

This is a direct pairing between a jurist and the name of his theory, so checking which of the four names is actually associated with a variable content idea, rather than a fixed natural order, settles it.

1. St. Thomas Aquinas: is linked to a fixed, eternal natural law, not a variable one.
2. John Locke: is linked to fixed natural rights, again not a variable-content theory.
3. Hobbes: treated natural law as constant dictates of reason, not as something that changes content over time.
4. R. Stammler: is the jurist specifically remembered for arguing that justice has a constant form but a content that shifts with changing social conditions, which is literally the theory named in the question.

Since only Stammler's theory carries this exact variable-content characterisation, the correct answer is R. Stammler.

Answer 7

Each of the four names carries a distinct, well-known theoretical signature, and matching communicative action to the right signature is a simple process of elimination.

1. Habermas: is precisely the thinker known for grounding rational discourse and communicative action as the basis of legitimate law and social coordination.
2. John Locke: is remembered for social contract and natural rights theory, a different tradition altogether.
3. Savigny: belongs to the historical school, focused on custom and the spirit of a people, not communicative rationality.
4. Lon L. Fuller: is tied to procedural legality and the inner morality of law, not communicative action.

Since only one of the four names matches the theory named in the question, the correct answer is Habermas.

Answer 8

The passage names its own source of legitimacy in plain language, so the fastest check is to line up each option against that specific sentence rather than reasoning from general jurisprudence.

1. Morality: is explicitly described as parallel to, not the source of, positive law's legitimacy.
2. Publication of Laws: is one ingredient of law's factual existence as a social fact, not the basis of its legitimacy.
3. Rational Democratic Process: is stated word for word in the passage as the exclusive source of both the legitimacy and the rationality of positive laws.
4. Judicial recognition: is never mentioned in the passage as a source of legitimacy at all.

Since the passage names the democratic process as the exclusive source of legitimacy, the correct answer is Rational Democratic Process.

Answer 9

The label positive is a technical term in jurisprudence, so it helps to trace it back to its root meaning, law that has been posited, rather than to guess from the everyday sense of the word positive.

1. Divine providence: is the opposite of what positive signals in this context, since positive law is precisely law that is not derived from a divine or natural source.
2. Collective positive action: sounds plausible but is too vague to capture the specific positivist idea of a determinate authority laying down the law.
3. Person in authority: matches the classical positivist account, where law is a command issued by a sovereign or authority and enforced by sanction, which is exactly why such law is called posited or positive.
4. Followed by everybody: describes compliance, not the source of the law's authority, and a positive law does not stop being positive merely because some people disobey it.

Since the term traces to law being deliberately laid down by an authority, the correct answer is it is made by person in authority.

Answer 10

Calling positivists romanticists only makes sense if their picture of law was an idealised escape rather than an honest mirror of their surroundings, and testing each option against that idea points to one answer.

1. Running away from the realities of post-industrial Britain: fits the romanticist label, since building a tidy, self-contained system of rules while industrial Britain was actually marked by disorder and inequality is exactly the kind of idealised escapism the term describes.
2. Not imagining a perfectly ordered society: contradicts the premise of the critique, which is that they did imagine such an order.
3. Depicting the actual state of law and order of contemporary Britain: would make them realists, not romanticists, so this runs opposite to the label.
4. None of the above: is not needed once one option matches cleanly.

Since the romanticist charge rests on positivists idealising away from the real conditions of the time, the correct answer is they were running away from the realities of post-industrial Britain.