Comprehension
Live-in relationship, as such, as already indicated, is a relationship which has not been socially accepted in India, unlike many other countries. In Lata Singh v. State of U.P. [(2006) 5 SCC 475: (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 478] it was observed that a live-in relationship between two consenting adults of heterosexual sex does not amount to any offence even though it may be perceived as immoral. However, in order to provide a remedy in civil law for protection of women, from being victims of such relationship, and to prevent the occurrence of domestic violence in the society, first time in India, the DV Act has been enacted to cover the couple having relationship in the nature of marriage, persons related by consanguinity, marriages, etc. We have few other legislations also where reliefs have been provided to woman placed in certain vulnerable situations. Section 125 Cr.P.C. of course, provides for maintenance of a destitute wife and Section 498-A IPC is related to mental cruelty inflicted on women by her husband and in-laws. Section 304-B IPC deals with the cases relating to dowry death. The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 was enacted to deal with the cases of dowry demands by the husband and family members. The Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 provides for grant of maintenance to a legally wedded Hindu wife, and also deals with rules for adoption. The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 refers to the provisions dealing with solemnisation of marriage also deals with the provisions for divorce. For the first time, though, the DV Act, Parliament has recognised a “relationship in the nature of marriage” and not a live-in relationship simpliciter. We have already stated, when we examine whether a relationship will fall within the expression “relationship in the nature of marriage” within the meaning of Section 2(f ) of the DV Act, we should have a close analysis of the entire relationship invariably, it may be a question of fact and degree, whether a relationship between two unrelated persons of the opposite sex meets the tests judicially evolved.
(This extract is taken from Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, (2013) 15 SCC 755)
Question: 1

What is the scope of analysis required to determine if a relationship falls within the expression “relationship in the nature of marriage” under Section 2(f) of the DV Act?

Updated On: Jan 13, 2026
  • Considering the number of children born in a live in relationship
  • Considering only the cohabitation period of the relationship and there emotional connectivity
  • Conducting a close analysis of the entire interpersonal relationship, taking into account all facets
  • Evaluating only the financial aspects and mutual agreements of the relationship, and if there is any written agreement between the partner
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The Correct Option is C

Solution and Explanation

Assessing if a relationship qualifies as a "relationship in the nature of marriage" under Section 2(f) of the DV Act demands a complete review of the entire relationship. This assessment surpasses simple cohabitation or finances, requiring examination of all aspects. Key factors include emotional connection, mutual support, public perception, shared duties, and a commitment to the relationship's longevity. This is a complex factual determination, often requiring judicial oversight to ensure alignment with legal standards.
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Question: 2

In which of the following case, the Supreme Court read down the word “adult male” in Section 2(q) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005?

Updated On: Jan 13, 2026
  • Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma
  • Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Harsora
  • Uma Narayan v. Priya Krishna Prasad
  • All of the above
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The Correct Option is B

Solution and Explanation

The correct answer is Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Harsora to the question: "In which of the following case, the Supreme Court read down the word 'adult male' in Section 2(q) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005?"
This Supreme Court decision addressed the context and interpretation of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. This Act aimed to protect women from domestic violence through civil remedies.
The original Act defined the respondent as an "adult male." However, in Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Harsora, the Supreme Court deemed this restrictive and unconstitutional because it discriminated based on gender. The ruling expanded the definition to include any person in a domestic relationship as a potential respondent, regardless of gender, thereby strengthening the Act's protections for women.
This decision significantly changed the interpretation of women's protective laws in India, promoting equality and a gender-neutral application of the law.
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Question: 3

As per Section 20 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, while disposing of an application under Section 12(1), the Magistrate may direct the respondent to pay monetary relief to the aggrieved person so that the aggrieved person can:

Updated On: Jan 13, 2026
  • Live a life that meets at least the bare minimum needs for survival and basic well-being
  • Live a life that is consistent with her standard of living which she is accustomed
  • Live a life that is consistent with her parent’s standard of living
  • Live a life which can cover her medical expenses and expenses incurred due to litigation of domestic violence
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The Correct Option is B

Solution and Explanation

To address the query concerning Section 20 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, a grasp of the Act and this specific section is crucial:
  • Section 20 empowers the Magistrate to grant monetary relief to an aggrieved individual.
  • The objective of this financial aid is to facilitate the aggrieved person's maintenance of her pre-incident standard of living.
From the provided choices, the correct answer is:
  • Live a life that is consistent with her standard of living which she is accustomed
This reflects the Act's goal of enabling the aggrieved person to sustain a life of dignity and security, mirroring her pre-violence lifestyle.
The alternative options primarily focus on basic subsistence or external living standards, which don't fully achieve the statute's aim of reinstating the aggrieved person's customary standard.
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Question: 4

In which case, the three-judge bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has recently interpreted the term “shared household” and has held that “...lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship...” have to be given its normal and purposeful meaning. The living of woman in a household has to refer to a living which has some permanency. Mere fleeting or casual living at different places shall not make a shared household?

Updated On: Jan 13, 2026
  • Rupa Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja
  • Satish Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra
  • S.R. Batra v. Tarin Batra
  • B.R. Mehta v. Atma Devi
Show Solution

The Correct Option is A

Solution and Explanation

In the case of Rupa Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja, a three-judge bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court recently defined "shared household." The court determined that "lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship" implies permanency. Temporary or casual living situations do not establish a "shared household."

The definition of "shared household" is important for the Domestic Violence Act, 2005. This Act protects women from domestic violence, including relationships similar to marriage that weren't always legally recognized. As emphasized in Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, live-in relationships are covered if they resemble marriage in terms of permanence.

Additional legal measures offer protection to vulnerable women, including:

  • Section 125 Cr.P.C.: Maintenance for a destitute wife.
  • Section 498-A IPC: Addresses mental cruelty by a husband and his family.
  • Section 304-B IPC: Deals with dowry-related deaths.
  • The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961: Addresses dowry demands.
  • The Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956: Provides maintenance for legally wedded Hindu wives.
  • The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955: Covers marriage and divorce.

These legal tools demonstrate the Indian judiciary's and legislature's commitment to safeguarding women's rights in domestic relationships.

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Question: 5

Under Indian Law, can a woman in a live in relationship claim maintenance under S. 125, Cr.P.C. despite not being a legally wedded wife?

Updated On: Jan 13, 2026
  • No, as per the interpretation of statute “wife” means legally wedded wife and includes who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from her husband
  • Yes, a woman in a live in relationship can claim maintenance u/s 125, Cr.P.C. as strict proof of marriage is not necessary and maintenance cannot be denied if evidence suggests cohabitation
  • A woman in live in relationship can only claim maintenance if she has been cohabiting for more than five years and dependent children from the relationship
  • A woman in live in relationship can claim maintenance only through a civil suit as the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (PWDVA) does not apply to live in relationships
Show Solution

The Correct Option is B

Solution and Explanation

Indian law addresses whether a woman in a live-in relationship can seek maintenance under Section 125, Cr.P.C., even without being legally married. This involves understanding recent legal changes and court rulings. Here's a breakdown:
  • Section 125, Cr.P.C. offers maintenance to neglected wives, children, and parents unable to support themselves. The term "wife" traditionally meant a legally married woman. However, recent legal decisions have expanded this to include vulnerable women not formally married.
  • Live-in relationships in India, though not widely accepted socially, have gained legal recognition for protection under some laws. The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (PWDVA), applies to couples in a "relationship in the nature of marriage."
  • In Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma (2013), the Supreme Court of India recognized that live-in relationships similar to marriage could be protected against domestic violence, enabling such women to claim maintenance, even without formal marriage.
  • The key point is that if evidence shows a stable, monogamous, long-term cohabitation like marriage, denying maintenance solely because of the lack of legal marriage could be unjust. Therefore, courts have interpreted the law to prevent exploitation and provide financial support to women in these relationships.
In essence, a woman in a live-in relationship *can* claim maintenance under Section 125, Cr.P.C. Formal proof of marriage isn't always needed, and maintenance shouldn't be denied if the evidence shows a relationship resembling marriage. This interpretation protects women from financial hardship when the relationship mirrors marriage but lacks formal legal status.
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Top Questions on Family Laws

Questions Asked in CLAT PG exam

An unpleasant tussle ensured between the TATA Sons and Cyrus Pallonji Mistry (“CPM”) in October 2016, when Mistry, who was the sixth chairman of Tata Sons, was ousted from the position of Executive Chairman of Tata Sons Limited. CPM took over as the chairman in 2012 after Ratan Tata announced his retirement. Tata Group patriarch Ratan Tata had personally asked Cyrus Mistry to resign as chairman of Tata Sons as the board had lost faith in him, but his refusal led to the removal via majority vote. Cyrus Investments Private limited and Sterling Investment Corporation Private Limited belonged to the Shapoorji Palloni Group in which CPM held a controlling interest (about 2% of the issued share capital of Tata Sons). Seven out of the nine directors of Tata Sons voted for CPM’s replacement after Farida Khambata abstained and Mistry was declared ineligible to vote as he was an interested director. Mistry challenged his removal, accusing the board of mismanagement and of oppressing minority shareholders. however, the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) rejected his petition. After this Mistry challenged his removal in National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). In 2018, NCLAT order restored Mistry as the group’s executive chairman. Tata Sons challenged that NCLAT order in Supreme Court. CPM also challenged the order for few more relief. Supreme Court stayed NCLAT’s order reinstating Cyrus Mistry as the executive chairman of Tata Sons and restoring his directorships in the holding company as well as three group companies, with a preliminary observation that the first impression of the order was “not good” and that the tribunal ‘could’ not have given consequential relief that had not been sought in the first place. Ultimately, the Supreme Court decided the case in favour of Tata Sons. One of the issues decided by Supreme Court was that “whether the case was fit to be qualified as a situation of ‘Oppression and Mismanagement’ under Section 241 of the Companies Act, 2013?”. On this issue, the Supreme Court observed that “unless the removal of a person as a chairman of a company is oppressive or mismanaged or done in a prejudicial manner damaging the interests of the company, its members or the public at large, the NCLT cannot interfere with the removal of a person as a Chairman of a Company in a petition under Section 241 of the Companies Act, 2013.” This case highlighted the point that “an executive chairman does not have sovereign authority over the company. In corporate democracy, decision making always remains with the Board as long as they enjoy the pleasure of the shareholders. Likewise, an executive chairman will continue as long as he/she enjoys the pleasure of the Board. An assumption by the executive chairman that he/she would have a free hand in running the affairs of the company is incongruous to corporate governance and corporate democracy. The Tribunal held that the concept of ‘free hand rule’ is antithesis to collective responsibility and collective decision making”.
[Based on Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. v. Cyrus Investment Pvt. Ltd., 2021 SCC 122].
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Alastair Hudson in his book ‘Securities Law’ First Edition (Sweet & Maxwell), 2008 at page 342, refers to ‘Restricted Offers’ and noticed that there is no contravention of Section 85 of FSMA 2000, if: “(b) the offer is made to or directed at fewer than 100 persons, other than qualified investors, per EEA State”. The purpose underlying that exemption, the author says, is mainly the fact that the offer is not being made to an appreciable section of “the public” such that the policy of the prospectus rules generally is not affected. Further, the author says that “Self-evidently, while an offer to 99 ordinary members of the public would be within the literal terms of the exemption, it would not be the sort of activity anticipated by the legislation. Moreover, if a marketing campaign were arranged such that ordinary members of the people were approached in groups of 99 people at a time in an effort to avoid the prospectus rules, then that would not appear to be within the spirit of the regulations and might be held to contravene the core principle that a regulated person must act with integrity.”
I may, therefore, indicate, subject to what has been stated above, in India that any share or debenture issue beyond forty-nine persons, would be a public issue attracting all the relevant provisions of the SEBI Act, regulations framed thereunder, the Companies Act, pertaining to the public issue. Facts clearly reveal that Saharas have issued securities to the public more than the threshold limit statutorily fixed under the first proviso to Section 67(3) and hence violated the listing provisions which may attract civil and criminal liabilities. Principles of listing, which I may later on discuss, is intended to assist public companies in identifying their obligations and responsibilities, which are continuing in nature, transparent in content and call for high degree of integrity. Obligations are imposed on the issuer on an ongoing basis. Public companies who are legally obliged to list their securities are deemed to accept the continuing obligations, by virtue of their application, prospectus and the subsequent maintenance of listing on a recognized stock exchange. Disclosure is the rule, there is no exception. Misleading public is a serious crime, which may attract civil and criminal liability. Listing of securities depends not upon one’s volition, but on statutory mandate.
[Extract from Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited v. Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), Para 89-91, Civil Appeal No. 9833/2011 (SC)]
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The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words, they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past, it was thought that it included just two rules namely: (1) no one shall be a judge in his own case (Nemo debet esse judex propria causa) and (2) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem).
Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice. Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is not questioned.
If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi-judicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry as observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala [Civil Appeal No. 990/68, decided on 15-07- 1968], the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case.
[Extract from the judgment of the Supreme Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262, decided on April 29, 1969, hereafter ‘A.K. Kraipak’].
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The doctrine of promissory estoppel is by now well recognized and well defined by a catena of decisions of this Court. Where the Government makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promise and, in fact, the promise, acting in reliance on it, alters his position, the Government would be held bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Government at the instance of the promise notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 229 of the Constitution. The rule of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine has to be moulded to suit the particular situation. It is not a hard-and-fast rule but an elastic one, the objective of which is to do justice between the parties and to extend an equitable treatment to them. This doctrine is a principle evolved by equity, to avoid injustice and though commonly named promissory estoppel, it is neither in the realm of contract nor in the realm of estoppel. For application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel the promise must establish that he suffered in detriment or altered his position by reliance on the promise.
Normally, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is being applied against the Government and defence based on executive necessity would not be accepted by the court. However, if it can be shown by the Government that having regard to the facts as they have subsequently transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government to the promise made by it, the court would not raise an equity in favour of the promise and enforce the promise against the Government. Where public interest warrants, the principles of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked. The Government can change the policy in public interest. However, it is well settled that taking cue from this doctrine, the authority cannot be compelled to do something which is not allowed by law or prohibited by law. There is no promissory estoppel against the settled proposition of law. Doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked for enforcement of a promise made contrary to law, because none can be compelled to act against the statute. Thus, the Government or public authority cannot be compelled to make a provision which is contrary to law.
[Extract from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shree Sidhbali Steels Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2011) 3 SCC 193, decided on January 20, 2011, hereafter ‘Shree Sidhbali Steels’].
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