Comprehension
It will be relevant to refer to the statement made by the contemnor which was made and read out before this Court by the contemnor on 20.08.2020, which reads as under:
“I have gone through the judgment of this Hon‟ble Court. I am pained that I have been held guilty of committing contempt of the Court whose majesty I have tried to uphold - not as a courtier or cheerleader but as a humble guard - for over three decades, at some personal and professional cost. I am pained, not because I may be punished, but because I have been grossly misunderstood. I am shocked that the court holds me guilty of “malicious, scurrilous, calculated attack” on the institution of administration of justice. I am dismayed that the Court has arrived at this conclusion without providing any evidence of my motives to launch such an attack. I must confess that I am disappointed that the court did not find it necessary to serve me with a copy of the complaint on the basis of which the suo-motu notice was issued, nor found it necessary to respond to the specific averments made by me in my reply affidavit or the many submissions of my counsel. I find it hard to believe that the Court finds my tweet “has the effect of destabilizing the very foundation of this important pillar of Indian democracy”. I can only reiterate that these two tweets represented my bona-fide beliefs, the expression of which must be permissible in any democracy. Indeed, public scrutiny is desirable for healthy functioning of judiciary itself. I believe that open criticism of any institution is necessary in a democracy, to safeguard the constitutional order. We are living through that moment in our history when higher principles must trump routine obligations, when saving the constitutional order must come before personal and professional niceties, when considerations of the present must not come in the way of discharging our responsibility towards the future. Failing to speak up would have been a dereliction of duty, especially for an officer of the court like myself. My tweets were nothing but a small attempt to discharge what I considered to be my highest duty at this juncture in the history of our republic. I did not tweet in a fit of absence mindedness. It would be insincere and contemptuous on my part to offer an apology for the tweets that expressed what was and continues to be my bona-fide belief. Therefore, I can only humbly paraphrase what the father of the nation Mahatma Gandhi had said in his trial: I do not ask for mercy. I do not appeal to magnanimity. I am here, therefore, to cheerfully submit to any penalty that can lawfully be inflicted upon me for what the Court has determined to be an offence, and what appears to me to be the highest duty of a citizen.”
Source: Excerpt taken from the Judgment delivered by Arun Mishra, B. R. Gavai & Krishna Murari, J.J.
Question: 1

The above passage has been taken from which of the following recent cases relating to the Criminal Contempt of Court?

Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
  • In Re: Prashant Bhushan & Anr.
  • The Registrar General, Supreme Court of India v. Prashant Bhushan & Anr.
  • Amicus Curiae v. Prashant Bhushan
  • Union of India v. Prashant Bhushan & Anr.
Show Solution

The Correct Option is C

Solution and Explanation

A suo motu contempt matter, where the Court itself initiates proceedings rather than a party filing them, is conventionally reported with a cause title beginning “In Re”, and the bench named in the passage is the surest anchor for identifying the exact case.

  1. A title naming the Registrar General as the moving party does not match how a suo motu proceeding of this kind is actually cited.
  2. An amicus curiae assisting the Court is not treated as a named party in the cause title, so a title styled around the amicus does not fit either.
  3. The Union of India did not bring these proceedings, so a cause title naming it as petitioner is inconsistent with how the case arose.
  4. The bench of Arun Mishra, B.R. Gavai and Krishna Murari, JJ., named at the end of the passage matches the suo motu ruling reported as In Re: Prashant Bhushan & Anr., confirming it as the source.

The correct answer is In Re: Prashant Bhushan & Anr.

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Question: 2

The Source of power of the Supreme Court to take suo-motu cognizance of Contempt of the Court has been provided under which of the following?

Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
  • Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
  • Article 129 r/w Section 13 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
  • Article 129
  • Article 129 r/w Article 141.
Show Solution

The Correct Option is C

Solution and Explanation

The distinction to draw here is between where a power comes from and how it is procedurally exercised.

  1. Section 15 of the 1971 Act is procedural machinery, not the fountainhead of the power.
  2. Linking Article 129 with a statutory section wrongly makes a constitutional power contingent on legislation.
  3. Article 129 alone, by declaring the Supreme Court a court of record with all the powers of such a court, including contempt of itself, is a complete and independent source of the power.
  4. Article 141 governs binding precedent and has no bearing on contempt jurisdiction.

The correct answer is Article 129.

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Question: 3

Which of the following could be a valid defence for the contemnor in a contempt proceeding against him?

Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
  • Statements are bona-fide fair criticism without attributing motives to the judges.
  • Statements are the personal opinion of the person and do not have the capacity to influence the thinking of public at large
  • Statements are based on the quotes from retired judges of the Supreme Court.
  • Statements are mere opinions which does not fall under the category of the term "scandalising the court."
Show Solution

The Correct Option is A

Solution and Explanation

Contempt law protects criticism, not immunity for any statement that happens to be an opinion.

  1. Claiming a statement had no real influence on public opinion is not a recognised test; the law asks whether the statement undermines confidence in justice, not whether it persuaded anyone.
  2. Borrowing words from retired judges does not change whether the statement itself is contemptuous in its own right.
  3. Calling something a mere opinion does not exempt it if it attributes improper motives to a judge.
  4. Bona fide, fair criticism made without attributing motives is the one defence courts consistently accept.

The correct answer is that the statements are bona fide fair criticism without attributing motives to the judges.

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Question: 4

In which of the following cases, the apex court held that, "Contempt jurisdiction should not be used by judges to uphold their own dignity. In the free market-place of ideas, criticism about the judicial system or the judges should be welcomed, so long as criticisms do not impair or hamper the „administration of justice‘."?

Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
  • Amicus Curiae v. Prashant Bhushan
  • P.N. Duda v. V. P. Shivshankar
  • A.K. Gopalan v. Noordeen
  • Hari Singh Nagra v. Kapil Sibal
Show Solution

The Correct Option is D

Solution and Explanation

The proposition draws a line between contempt used to guard the administration of justice and contempt misused to protect a judge's personal standing.

  1. No ruling is actually styled with an amicus curiae as a named party, so that option cannot be the source.
  2. P.N. Duda concerned a Minister's public speech, a different factual setting from the one this proposition is tied to.
  3. A.K. Gopalan v. Noordeen is about personal defamation of a judge, a related but distinct theme.
  4. Hari Singh Nagra v. Kapil Sibal fits the Bar-protest setting and directly states that judges should not use contempt to guard their own dignity, while tolerating open criticism that does not hamper justice.

The correct answer is Hari Singh Nagra v. Kapil Sibal.

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Question: 5

Which of the following can be stated as not true about the intent of the contemnor as mentioned in the passage above?

Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
  • He believes in the dignity and independence of judiciary and his act, further strengthens his belief.
  • His statements hold the sanctity of the institution to be of utmost importance and his actions will uphold the same.
  • He compares himself with the father of the nation Mahatma Gandhi and puts himself at the same pedestal.
  • His statements are criticism of an individual and not the institution itself and such criticism is quintessential for a healthy democracy.
Show Solution

The Correct Option is C

Solution and Explanation

Checking each description against the contemnor's own words in the passage isolates the one that does not fit.

  1. His description of himself as a long-serving, humble guardian of the court's majesty supports, rather than contradicts, a stated belief in judicial dignity.
  2. His remarks framing public scrutiny as necessary for a healthy judiciary support, rather than contradict, a claim about valuing institutional sanctity.
  3. His invocation of Gandhi is expressly qualified as a humble paraphrase and cheerful submission to penalty, not a claim of equal stature, so describing his intent as placing himself on Gandhi's pedestal does not fit his own words.
  4. His framing of criticism as necessary for democracy in general supports the idea that he sees his criticism as institutional rather than purely personal.

The correct answer is that he compares himself with the father of the nation Mahatma Gandhi and puts himself at the same pedestal, since this is the one description his own qualifying language does not support.

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Question: 6

A comparison of the Freedom of Speech and Expression between the text of Constitution of India and the U.S. Constitution may lead to many conclusions. Which of the following is not a conclusion of such a comparison?

Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
  • The U.S. Constitution expressly mentions about the Freedom of Press but does not mention about the Freedom of Expression.
  • The Freedom of Press though not expressly mentioned under Article 19 (1) (a), it is implicit under the Freedom of Speech
  • The idea of Freedom of Speech and Expression is much broader in India as compared to that in the U.S. Constitution
  • The Freedom of Speech and Expression under both the constitutions is identical in terms of its extent.
Show Solution

The Correct Option is C

Solution and Explanation

The First Amendment carries no express restriction clause comparable to Article 19(2)'s eight enumerated grounds, which is why American free speech doctrine is usually regarded as the less qualified of the two, not the Indian one.

  1. The observation that the U.S. text names the press but not “expression” as such holds up on a plain textual comparison.
  2. The observation that Indian courts read press freedom into “speech and expression” despite no express mention also holds up.
  3. Both systems recognise a comparable core right of speech and expression even though their restriction mechanisms differ, so a broad statement that they are similar in the right they protect is defensible.
  4. Claiming the Indian right is “much broader” than the American one gets the comparison backwards, since it is Article 19(2)'s restrictions, not the First Amendment, that carry the more elaborate express qualifications.

The claim that Freedom of Speech and Expression is much broader in India than in the U.S. Constitution does not hold up on this comparison, which is exactly why that is the statement that is not a valid conclusion here.

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Question: 7

Which of the following case is not related to the Contempt of Court as a restriction to the Freedom of Speech and Expression enshrined under Article 19 (1) (a)?

Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
  • In Re Arundhati Roy, (2002) 3 SCC 343
  • Hari Singh Nagra v. Kapil Sibal, AIR 2010 SC 55.
  • In Re Harijai Singh, (1996) 6 SCC 466.
  • Subramaniam Swamy v. UOI, (2016) 7 SCC 221.
Show Solution

The Correct Option is D

Solution and Explanation

Article 19(2) lists several separate grounds of restriction on free speech, including both contempt of court and defamation as distinct heads, and this question tests whether the listed cases fall under the same head.

  1. In Re Arundhati Roy is a contempt case.
  2. Hari Singh Nagra v. Kapil Sibal is a contempt case.
  3. In Re Harijai Singh is a contempt case.
  4. Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India upholds criminal defamation, a separate head of restriction under Article 19(2) altogether, not contempt of court.

The correct answer is Subramaniam Swamy v. UOI, (2016) 7 SCC 221.

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Question: 8

In which of the following cases it was held that holding Dharna in front of Supreme Court in which lawyers too, take part is not by itself Contempt of Court if the access to the Court is not hindered?

Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
  • Hiralal Dixit v. Union of India
  • J.R. Parashar v. Prashant Bhushan
  • Tarun Bharat Singh v. Union of India
  • P. N. Duda v. V. P. Shivshankar
Show Solution

The Correct Option is A

Solution and Explanation

The test the question describes is narrow and specific: a demonstration outside the Supreme Court is not, without more, contempt, unless it actually blocks access to the Court.

  1. A case about pleadings and procedure in contempt matters does not establish this specific proposition about demonstrations.
  2. A case with no demonstration outside the Court premises at all cannot be the source of this holding.
  3. A case about a public speech criticising a judgment involves a different kind of restriction on speech altogether, not a physical protest outside the Court.
  4. The ruling that squarely considered a dharna outside the Court, including lawyers among the protesters, and held it is not per se contempt absent obstruction of access, is the one that fits the question.

The correct answer is Hiralal Dixit v. Union of India.

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Question: 9

Justice Krishna Iyer in (1) observed that normative guideline for Judges to observe in contempt jurisdiction is not to be (2) even where distortions and criticism oversteps thelimitation.

Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
  • (1) S. Mulgaokar, (2) hypersensitive
  • (1) Shamsher Singh, (2) provocative
  • (1) Hira Lal, (2) emotional
  • (1) Ediga Annama, (2) sensitive
Show Solution

The Correct Option is A

Solution and Explanation

Krishna Iyer J.'s opinion in In Re: S. Mulgaokar is one of the most frequently cited passages on how the contempt power should be used against the press.

  1. Option (A): Correct. The judgment holds that judges must not be hypersensitive to criticism, even where it oversteps fair limits, because the contempt jurisdiction exists to protect the administration of justice, not the personal feelings of judges.
  2. Option (B): Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab deals with gubernatorial and presidential discretion, an entirely different branch of constitutional law, so it cannot supply the missing case name here.
  3. Option (C): Hira Lal is unconnected with the contempt guidelines and "emotional" is not the term used in the judgment.
  4. Option (D): Ediga Annama belongs to sentencing jurisprudence, and "sensitive" inverts the actual guidance, which warns against being too sensitive, not too little.

The only combination that reflects the real case and the real word used by Krishna Iyer J. is S. Mulgaokar and hypersensitive, so option (A) is the answer.

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Question: 10

Late Arun Jaitely, in Parliament had said that the Supreme Court is destroying the edifice of Parliament brick by brick. Another member responded by saying transparency in judicial appointments is required as half the judges in the country lack integrity. Are these statements Contempt of Court after the Prashant Bhushan 2020 judgment?

Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
  • Yes, because MPs are also bound by Contempt law
  • No, because MPs are exempted from Contempt law.
  • Jaitely can‘t be punished as he is no more but the other member can be held liable.
  • No, because the statements made in Parliament are protected.
Show Solution

The Correct Option is D

Solution and Explanation

Article 105(2) of the Constitution gives Members of Parliament freedom of speech inside the House, and that provision controls this question rather than the general contempt jurisdiction.

  1. Option (A): Wrong, because it treats MPs as having no special constitutional shield, when Article 105(2) exists precisely to remove court proceedings, including contempt, from statements made on the floor of the House.
  2. Option (B): Wrong in its reasoning, since the immunity is not a personal exemption from contempt law as such, it is a location-specific privilege tied to speech made within Parliament.
  3. Option (C): Wrong, because it focuses on the speaker's death rather than the source of the immunity, and wrongly assumes the other member would be exposed to contempt despite speaking in the House.
  4. Option (D): Correct. It identifies the real basis, parliamentary privilege under Article 105(2), which protects both speakers regardless of what was said, as long as it was said inside Parliament.

Since the immunity flows from where the words were spoken, option (D) states the legally accurate answer.

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Top Questions on Jurisprudence

Questions Asked in CLAT PG exam

An unpleasant tussle ensured between the TATA Sons and Cyrus Pallonji Mistry (“CPM”) in October 2016, when Mistry, who was the sixth chairman of Tata Sons, was ousted from the position of Executive Chairman of Tata Sons Limited. CPM took over as the chairman in 2012 after Ratan Tata announced his retirement. Tata Group patriarch Ratan Tata had personally asked Cyrus Mistry to resign as chairman of Tata Sons as the board had lost faith in him, but his refusal led to the removal via majority vote. Cyrus Investments Private limited and Sterling Investment Corporation Private Limited belonged to the Shapoorji Palloni Group in which CPM held a controlling interest (about 2% of the issued share capital of Tata Sons). Seven out of the nine directors of Tata Sons voted for CPM’s replacement after Farida Khambata abstained and Mistry was declared ineligible to vote as he was an interested director. Mistry challenged his removal, accusing the board of mismanagement and of oppressing minority shareholders. however, the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) rejected his petition. After this Mistry challenged his removal in National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). In 2018, NCLAT order restored Mistry as the group’s executive chairman. Tata Sons challenged that NCLAT order in Supreme Court. CPM also challenged the order for few more relief. Supreme Court stayed NCLAT’s order reinstating Cyrus Mistry as the executive chairman of Tata Sons and restoring his directorships in the holding company as well as three group companies, with a preliminary observation that the first impression of the order was “not good” and that the tribunal ‘could’ not have given consequential relief that had not been sought in the first place. Ultimately, the Supreme Court decided the case in favour of Tata Sons. One of the issues decided by Supreme Court was that “whether the case was fit to be qualified as a situation of ‘Oppression and Mismanagement’ under Section 241 of the Companies Act, 2013?”. On this issue, the Supreme Court observed that “unless the removal of a person as a chairman of a company is oppressive or mismanaged or done in a prejudicial manner damaging the interests of the company, its members or the public at large, the NCLT cannot interfere with the removal of a person as a Chairman of a Company in a petition under Section 241 of the Companies Act, 2013.” This case highlighted the point that “an executive chairman does not have sovereign authority over the company. In corporate democracy, decision making always remains with the Board as long as they enjoy the pleasure of the shareholders. Likewise, an executive chairman will continue as long as he/she enjoys the pleasure of the Board. An assumption by the executive chairman that he/she would have a free hand in running the affairs of the company is incongruous to corporate governance and corporate democracy. The Tribunal held that the concept of ‘free hand rule’ is antithesis to collective responsibility and collective decision making”.
[Based on Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. v. Cyrus Investment Pvt. Ltd., 2021 SCC 122].
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Alastair Hudson in his book ‘Securities Law’ First Edition (Sweet & Maxwell), 2008 at page 342, refers to ‘Restricted Offers’ and noticed that there is no contravention of Section 85 of FSMA 2000, if: “(b) the offer is made to or directed at fewer than 100 persons, other than qualified investors, per EEA State”. The purpose underlying that exemption, the author says, is mainly the fact that the offer is not being made to an appreciable section of “the public” such that the policy of the prospectus rules generally is not affected. Further, the author says that “Self-evidently, while an offer to 99 ordinary members of the public would be within the literal terms of the exemption, it would not be the sort of activity anticipated by the legislation. Moreover, if a marketing campaign were arranged such that ordinary members of the people were approached in groups of 99 people at a time in an effort to avoid the prospectus rules, then that would not appear to be within the spirit of the regulations and might be held to contravene the core principle that a regulated person must act with integrity.”
I may, therefore, indicate, subject to what has been stated above, in India that any share or debenture issue beyond forty-nine persons, would be a public issue attracting all the relevant provisions of the SEBI Act, regulations framed thereunder, the Companies Act, pertaining to the public issue. Facts clearly reveal that Saharas have issued securities to the public more than the threshold limit statutorily fixed under the first proviso to Section 67(3) and hence violated the listing provisions which may attract civil and criminal liabilities. Principles of listing, which I may later on discuss, is intended to assist public companies in identifying their obligations and responsibilities, which are continuing in nature, transparent in content and call for high degree of integrity. Obligations are imposed on the issuer on an ongoing basis. Public companies who are legally obliged to list their securities are deemed to accept the continuing obligations, by virtue of their application, prospectus and the subsequent maintenance of listing on a recognized stock exchange. Disclosure is the rule, there is no exception. Misleading public is a serious crime, which may attract civil and criminal liability. Listing of securities depends not upon one’s volition, but on statutory mandate.
[Extract from Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited v. Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), Para 89-91, Civil Appeal No. 9833/2011 (SC)]
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The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words, they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past, it was thought that it included just two rules namely: (1) no one shall be a judge in his own case (Nemo debet esse judex propria causa) and (2) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem).
Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice. Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is not questioned.
If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi-judicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry as observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala [Civil Appeal No. 990/68, decided on 15-07- 1968], the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case.
[Extract from the judgment of the Supreme Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262, decided on April 29, 1969, hereafter ‘A.K. Kraipak’].
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The doctrine of promissory estoppel is by now well recognized and well defined by a catena of decisions of this Court. Where the Government makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promise and, in fact, the promise, acting in reliance on it, alters his position, the Government would be held bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Government at the instance of the promise notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 229 of the Constitution. The rule of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine has to be moulded to suit the particular situation. It is not a hard-and-fast rule but an elastic one, the objective of which is to do justice between the parties and to extend an equitable treatment to them. This doctrine is a principle evolved by equity, to avoid injustice and though commonly named promissory estoppel, it is neither in the realm of contract nor in the realm of estoppel. For application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel the promise must establish that he suffered in detriment or altered his position by reliance on the promise.
Normally, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is being applied against the Government and defence based on executive necessity would not be accepted by the court. However, if it can be shown by the Government that having regard to the facts as they have subsequently transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government to the promise made by it, the court would not raise an equity in favour of the promise and enforce the promise against the Government. Where public interest warrants, the principles of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked. The Government can change the policy in public interest. However, it is well settled that taking cue from this doctrine, the authority cannot be compelled to do something which is not allowed by law or prohibited by law. There is no promissory estoppel against the settled proposition of law. Doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked for enforcement of a promise made contrary to law, because none can be compelled to act against the statute. Thus, the Government or public authority cannot be compelled to make a provision which is contrary to law.
[Extract from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shree Sidhbali Steels Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2011) 3 SCC 193, decided on January 20, 2011, hereafter ‘Shree Sidhbali Steels’].
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