Comprehension
“In India, the government can be held liable for tortious acts of its servants and can be ordered to be paid compensation to the persons suffering as a result of the legal wrong. Article 294(b) of the Constitution declares that the liability of the Union Government or the State Government may arise “out of any contract or otherwise”. The word otherwise implies that the said liability may arise for tortious acts as well. Article 300 enables the institution of appropriate proceedings against the government for enforcing such liability. … Even prior to the commencement of the Constitution, the liability of the Government for tortious acts of its servants or agents were recognised vide Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v. Secy. of State, (1868-69) 5 Bom HCR APP 1. After the commencement of the Constitution, there have been several cases in which the Union of India and State Governments were held liable for tortious acts of their employees, servants and agents. All those cases were not necessarily by invoking the writ jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the High Courts. Though, the Government is liable for tortious acts of its officers, servants or employees, normally, such liability cannot be enforced by a Writ Court. An aggrieved party has the right to approach the competent court or authority to seek damages or compensation in accordance with the law of the land.
... But if fundamental rights have been violated, and if the court is satisfied that the grievance of the petitioner is well founded, it may grant the relief by enforcing a person’s fundamental right. Such relief may be in the form of monetary compensation/damages”. 
[Extracted from: Kaushal Kishore v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 113 of 2016, decided on January 3, 2023.]
Question: 1

A person may be liable in respect of wrongful acts or omissions of another in the following ways:

Updated On: Jan 13, 2026
  • As having ratified or authorised the particular acts
  • As standing towards the other person in a relation entailing responsibility for wrongs done by that person.
  • As having abetted the tortious acts committed by others
  • All the above
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The Correct Option is D

Solution and Explanation

Liability for another's harmful actions can be established through ratification, abetment, or a legal relationship with the person who caused harm.
The correct answer is (D): All the above

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Question: 2

In order to succeed in fixing vicarious liability on the master (defendant), the plaintiff has to establish

Updated On: Jan 13, 2026
  • That the relationship of master and servant subsisted between the defendant and the actual wrongdoer
  • That the wrongful act was done by the actual wrongdoer whilst he was engaged in the course of employment of the defendant
  • Both (A) and (B)
  • None of the above
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The Correct Option is C

Solution and Explanation

To establish vicarious liability, it's necessary to prove the wrongdoer was the defendant's employee and acted during their employment.
The answer is (C): Both (A) and (B)

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Question: 3

In India, which of the following enactments govern(s) the liability of the State for the tortious acts of its servants?

Updated On: Jan 13, 2026
  • The Crown Proceedings Act, 1947
  • The Federal Tort Claims Act, 1946
  • Both (A) and (B).
  • Neither (A) nor (B)
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The Correct Option is D

Solution and Explanation

India lacks a direct legal framework, akin to the Crown Proceedings Act or the Federal Tort Claims Act, specifically addressing State liability for torts. The correct answer is (D): Neither (A) nor (B).

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Question: 4

In which of the following cases, the Supreme Court of India dealt extensively with the concept of ‘constitutional tort’?

Updated On: Jan 13, 2026
  • Shyam Sunder v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1964 SC 890.
  • Common Cause (A Registered Society) v. Union of India, (2018) 5 SCC 1.
  • Municipal Corporation of Delhi, v. Uphaar Tragedy Victims Association, (2011) 14 SCC 481
  • All the above.
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The Correct Option is C

Solution and Explanation

The Supreme Court case, Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Uphaar Tragedy Victims Association, is important. It extensively discussed how the state is accountable for violating fundamental rights, a concept known as constitutional tort.
The correct answer is (C): Municipal Corporation of Delhi, v. Uphaar Tragedy Victims Association, (2011) 14 SCC 481

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Question: 5

Whether a statement by a Minister, inconsistent with the rights of a citizen under Part-III of the Constitution, constitutes a violation of such constitutional rights and is actionable as a ‘constitutional tort’:

Updated On: Jul 8, 2026
  • Yes, every statement made by a Minister, inconsistent with the rights of a citizen under Part-III of the Constitution, will constitute a violation of the constitutional rights and becomes actionable as a constitutional tort
  • Yes, if as a consequence of such a statement, any act of omission or commission is done by the officers resulting in harm or loss to a person/citizen, then the same may be actionable as a constitutional tort
  • No, in no case a statement by a Minister is actionable as a constitutional tort.
  • No, because it will hamper the functioning of the government and ministers.
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The Correct Option is B

Solution and Explanation

The question concerns whether a statement made by a Minister, which is inconsistent with the rights of a citizen under Part-III of the Constitution, can constitute a violation of those rights and be actionable as a constitutional tort.

To determine the answer, we need to explore the concept of 'constitutional tort' and its implications under Indian law:

  1. In India, the government can be held liable for tortious acts of its servants under Article 300 of the Constitution. This allows for appropriate legal proceedings against the government to enforce liability arising from tortious acts.
  2. The concept of constitutional tort arises when a government action or omission violates the fundamental rights of individuals guaranteed under Part-III of the Constitution.
  3. Fundamental Rights can be judicially enforced against the State if they are violated. A 'constitutional tort' therefore implies not just a civil wrong, but a government action causing a breach of these rights.
  4. In the case of Kaushal Kishore v. State of Uttar Pradesh, it was established that if a government statement or action leads to an act of omission or commission by officers which harms a citizen, this may be actionable as a constitutional tort.

Now, let's evaluate the options:

  • Option 1: "Yes, every statement made by a Minister, inconsistent with the rights of a citizen under Part-III of the Constitution, will constitute a violation of the constitutional rights and becomes actionable as a constitutional tort."
    This is incorrect because not every statement automatically leads to a constitutional tort. The determinative factor is whether a resulting act of omission or commission by officers causes harm.
  • Option 2: "Yes, if as a consequence of such a statement, any act of omission or commission is done by the officers resulting in harm or loss to a person/citizen, then the same may be actionable as a constitutional tort."
    This is correct. The key part is the consequence of the statement leading to harm caused through official action or inaction, aligning with the concept of constitutional tort.
  • Option 3: "No, in no case a statement by a Minister is actionable as a constitutional tort."
    This is incorrect because there are circumstances where a statement leads to consequential actions that infringe on constitutional rights, making it actionable.
  • Option 4: "No, because it will hamper the functioning of the government and ministers."
    This is incorrect as it does not consider the protection of fundamental rights and the legal framework in place for constitutional torts.

In conclusion, Option 2 is the correct answer. It properly identifies the condition under which a ministerial statement could become actionable as a constitutional tort, that is, when it leads to harm through acts of government officers.

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Top Questions on Law of Torts

Questions Asked in CLAT PG exam

An unpleasant tussle ensured between the TATA Sons and Cyrus Pallonji Mistry (“CPM”) in October 2016, when Mistry, who was the sixth chairman of Tata Sons, was ousted from the position of Executive Chairman of Tata Sons Limited. CPM took over as the chairman in 2012 after Ratan Tata announced his retirement. Tata Group patriarch Ratan Tata had personally asked Cyrus Mistry to resign as chairman of Tata Sons as the board had lost faith in him, but his refusal led to the removal via majority vote. Cyrus Investments Private limited and Sterling Investment Corporation Private Limited belonged to the Shapoorji Palloni Group in which CPM held a controlling interest (about 2% of the issued share capital of Tata Sons). Seven out of the nine directors of Tata Sons voted for CPM’s replacement after Farida Khambata abstained and Mistry was declared ineligible to vote as he was an interested director. Mistry challenged his removal, accusing the board of mismanagement and of oppressing minority shareholders. however, the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) rejected his petition. After this Mistry challenged his removal in National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). In 2018, NCLAT order restored Mistry as the group’s executive chairman. Tata Sons challenged that NCLAT order in Supreme Court. CPM also challenged the order for few more relief. Supreme Court stayed NCLAT’s order reinstating Cyrus Mistry as the executive chairman of Tata Sons and restoring his directorships in the holding company as well as three group companies, with a preliminary observation that the first impression of the order was “not good” and that the tribunal ‘could’ not have given consequential relief that had not been sought in the first place. Ultimately, the Supreme Court decided the case in favour of Tata Sons. One of the issues decided by Supreme Court was that “whether the case was fit to be qualified as a situation of ‘Oppression and Mismanagement’ under Section 241 of the Companies Act, 2013?”. On this issue, the Supreme Court observed that “unless the removal of a person as a chairman of a company is oppressive or mismanaged or done in a prejudicial manner damaging the interests of the company, its members or the public at large, the NCLT cannot interfere with the removal of a person as a Chairman of a Company in a petition under Section 241 of the Companies Act, 2013.” This case highlighted the point that “an executive chairman does not have sovereign authority over the company. In corporate democracy, decision making always remains with the Board as long as they enjoy the pleasure of the shareholders. Likewise, an executive chairman will continue as long as he/she enjoys the pleasure of the Board. An assumption by the executive chairman that he/she would have a free hand in running the affairs of the company is incongruous to corporate governance and corporate democracy. The Tribunal held that the concept of ‘free hand rule’ is antithesis to collective responsibility and collective decision making”.
[Based on Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. v. Cyrus Investment Pvt. Ltd., 2021 SCC 122].
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Alastair Hudson in his book ‘Securities Law’ First Edition (Sweet & Maxwell), 2008 at page 342, refers to ‘Restricted Offers’ and noticed that there is no contravention of Section 85 of FSMA 2000, if: “(b) the offer is made to or directed at fewer than 100 persons, other than qualified investors, per EEA State”. The purpose underlying that exemption, the author says, is mainly the fact that the offer is not being made to an appreciable section of “the public” such that the policy of the prospectus rules generally is not affected. Further, the author says that “Self-evidently, while an offer to 99 ordinary members of the public would be within the literal terms of the exemption, it would not be the sort of activity anticipated by the legislation. Moreover, if a marketing campaign were arranged such that ordinary members of the people were approached in groups of 99 people at a time in an effort to avoid the prospectus rules, then that would not appear to be within the spirit of the regulations and might be held to contravene the core principle that a regulated person must act with integrity.”
I may, therefore, indicate, subject to what has been stated above, in India that any share or debenture issue beyond forty-nine persons, would be a public issue attracting all the relevant provisions of the SEBI Act, regulations framed thereunder, the Companies Act, pertaining to the public issue. Facts clearly reveal that Saharas have issued securities to the public more than the threshold limit statutorily fixed under the first proviso to Section 67(3) and hence violated the listing provisions which may attract civil and criminal liabilities. Principles of listing, which I may later on discuss, is intended to assist public companies in identifying their obligations and responsibilities, which are continuing in nature, transparent in content and call for high degree of integrity. Obligations are imposed on the issuer on an ongoing basis. Public companies who are legally obliged to list their securities are deemed to accept the continuing obligations, by virtue of their application, prospectus and the subsequent maintenance of listing on a recognized stock exchange. Disclosure is the rule, there is no exception. Misleading public is a serious crime, which may attract civil and criminal liability. Listing of securities depends not upon one’s volition, but on statutory mandate.
[Extract from Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited v. Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), Para 89-91, Civil Appeal No. 9833/2011 (SC)]
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The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words, they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past, it was thought that it included just two rules namely: (1) no one shall be a judge in his own case (Nemo debet esse judex propria causa) and (2) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem).
Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice. Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is not questioned.
If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi-judicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry as observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala [Civil Appeal No. 990/68, decided on 15-07- 1968], the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case.
[Extract from the judgment of the Supreme Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262, decided on April 29, 1969, hereafter ‘A.K. Kraipak’].
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The doctrine of promissory estoppel is by now well recognized and well defined by a catena of decisions of this Court. Where the Government makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promise and, in fact, the promise, acting in reliance on it, alters his position, the Government would be held bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Government at the instance of the promise notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 229 of the Constitution. The rule of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine has to be moulded to suit the particular situation. It is not a hard-and-fast rule but an elastic one, the objective of which is to do justice between the parties and to extend an equitable treatment to them. This doctrine is a principle evolved by equity, to avoid injustice and though commonly named promissory estoppel, it is neither in the realm of contract nor in the realm of estoppel. For application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel the promise must establish that he suffered in detriment or altered his position by reliance on the promise.
Normally, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is being applied against the Government and defence based on executive necessity would not be accepted by the court. However, if it can be shown by the Government that having regard to the facts as they have subsequently transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government to the promise made by it, the court would not raise an equity in favour of the promise and enforce the promise against the Government. Where public interest warrants, the principles of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked. The Government can change the policy in public interest. However, it is well settled that taking cue from this doctrine, the authority cannot be compelled to do something which is not allowed by law or prohibited by law. There is no promissory estoppel against the settled proposition of law. Doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked for enforcement of a promise made contrary to law, because none can be compelled to act against the statute. Thus, the Government or public authority cannot be compelled to make a provision which is contrary to law.
[Extract from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shree Sidhbali Steels Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2011) 3 SCC 193, decided on January 20, 2011, hereafter ‘Shree Sidhbali Steels’].
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