Question:hard

Consider a case of negative production externality, where \(MSC\) is marginal social cost, \(MPC\) is marginal private cost, and \(MPB\) is marginal private benefit. Assume that the property rights belong to the polluter. As per the Coase theorem, payment \((p)\) will be acceptable to both parties (i.e., polluter and the affected party) when

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Under Coase theorem, bargaining succeeds when compensation lies between the polluter’s minimum acceptable amount and the affected party’s maximum willingness to pay.
Updated On: Jun 5, 2026
  • \[ (MSC-MPC)>p>(MPB-MPC) \]
  • \[ (MPB-MPC)>p>(MSC-MPC) \]
  • \[ (MPC-MSC)>p>(MPB-MPC) \]
  • \[ (MPC-MPB)>p>(MSC-MPC) \]
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The Correct Option is A

Solution and Explanation

Step 1: Set up the externality.
With a negative production externality the social cost is above the private cost, so $MSC>MPC$. The polluter owns the right to pollute.

Step 2: Think about who pays whom.
Because the polluter holds the right, the affected party must pay the polluter to cut output. Both sides need the payment to be worth it.

Step 3: Find the floor for the payment.
If the polluter cuts back, it loses net gain of $MPB-MPC$. So it will only agree if
\[ p>(MPB-MPC) \]

Step 4: Find the ceiling for the payment.
The affected party avoids damage worth $MSC-MPC$, so it will not pay more than that,
\[ p<(MSC-MPC) \]

Step 5: Put the bounds together.
\[ \boxed{(MSC-MPC)>p>(MPB-MPC)} \]
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