Comprehension
As new situations arise; the law has to be evolved in order to meet the challenge of such new situations. Law cannot afford to remain static. It should keep pace with changing socio-economic norms. We have to evolve new principles and lay down new norms which would adequately deal with the new problems which arise in a highly industrialized economy. We cannot allow our judicial thinking to be constricted by reference to the law as it prevails in England or for that matter in any other foreign country. We no longer need the crutches of a foreign legal order. We are certainly prepared to receive light from whatever source it comes but we have to build up our own jurisprudence and we cannot countenance an argument that merely because the new law does not recognize the rule of strict and absolute liability, we cannot have it too. Court should not feel inhibited by this rule merely because the new law does not recognise the rule of strict and absolute liability. The enterprise must be held to be under an obligation to provide that the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity in which it is engaged must be conducted with the highest standards of safety. The court discussed the scope of the Epistolary jurisdiction and reiterated that procedure being merely a handmaid of justice should not stand in the way to access to justice.
(Extracted with edits from M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1987) 1 SCC 395)
Question: 1

In which of the following cases, the term “Epistolary Jurisdiction” was first used in India?

Updated On: Jan 13, 2026
  • Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union v. Union of India, 1981 SC
  • Mumbai Kamgar Sabha v. Abdul Bhai, 1976 SC
  • ADM Jabalpur v. ShivKant Shukla, 1976 SC
  • Amba Devi v. Union of India, 1984 SC
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The Correct Option is A

Solution and Explanation

The term "Epistolary Jurisdiction" in Indian law originated in the case of Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union v. Union of India, 1981 SC. This case was a crucial development as courts acknowledged the need for law to adapt to the evolving socio-economic conditions of a modern, industrialized economy. Courts emphasized that the law should not be stagnant but should change alongside societal norms, affirming India's independent legal development. Epistolary Jurisdiction arose from the courts' view that procedural rules shouldn't prevent access to justice, highlighting the importance of accessible justice in addressing contemporary legal issues.
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Question: 2

Which of the following offences under the Indian Penal Code (IPC) has a strict liability connotation?

Updated On: Jan 13, 2026
  • Theft under Section 378 IPC
  • Defamation under Section 499 IPC
  • Bigamy under Section 494 IPC
  • Selling adulterated food or drink under Section 272 IPC
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The Correct Option is D

Solution and Explanation

To identify the Indian Penal Code (IPC) offense exhibiting strict liability, we must define "strict liability." It signifies liability without proof of fault (negligence or intent), relevant when activities present public risk or use hazardous materials.
Considering the provided options:
  • Theft (Section 378 IPC): Requires intent, thus not strict liability.
  • Defamation (Section 499 IPC): Requires intent or knowledge, excluding strict liability.
  • Bigamy (Section 494 IPC): Involves intent and knowledge, not strict liability.
  • Selling adulterated food or drink (Section 272 IPC): This focuses on public safety; liability applies regardless of the seller's knowledge or intent.
Therefore, Selling adulterated food or drink under Section 272 IPC exemplifies strict liability because of its public health and safety implications, establishing liability without needing to prove intent or negligence.
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Question: 3

“The Rule of Law is that the person who, for his own purpose, brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril; and if he does not do so is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape”.
Above rule has been evolved by the:

Updated On: Jan 13, 2026
  • Lord Burrough
  • Justice Blackburn
  • Lord Baron Diplock
  • None of the above
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The Correct Option is B

Solution and Explanation

The described legal principle, originating from Justice Blackburn in Rylands v. Fletcher, establishes strict liability. This means individuals are liable for damages resulting from the escape of a dangerous item or substance they brought onto their land. The rationale is that those who maintain potentially harmful items on their property are responsible for preventing their escape and are liable for any resulting harm.

This principle is tied to strict and absolute liability, especially concerning hazardous activities, as highlighted in related legal discussions. The focus is on high safety standards and accountability, reflecting the adaptation of legal rules to modern industrial hazards.

Originator of the rule: Justice Blackburn

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Question: 4

The rule of Rylands v. Fletcher is not applicable:

Updated On: Jan 13, 2026
  • When the escape is due to vis major or act of God
  • When the damage is due to the wrongful or malicious act of a stranger
  • When the escape is due to the plaintiff’s own fault
  • All of the above
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The Correct Option is D

Solution and Explanation

The legal principle of strict liability, as defined by Rylands v. Fletcher, has specific limitations. These are:
  1. Act of God: The Rylands v. Fletcher rule does not apply if the harmful escape is caused by unpredictable and extreme natural events (e.g., severe storms or earthquakes).
  2. Act of a Third Party: If a third party’s malicious actions cause the damage, and the defendant is not reasonably responsible, the rule is not applicable.
  3. Plaintiff's Fault: The defendant is not liable under this rule if the plaintiff's actions or negligence contributed to the escape.
Considering the legal principles and exceptions above, the correct answer is:
All of the above
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Question: 5

In India the ‘Absolute Liability’ theory on the basis of injuries caused by the hazardous industries was propounded by:

Updated On: Jan 13, 2026
  • V.R. Krishna Iyer, J.
  • P.N. Bhagwati, C.J.
  • Kuldip Singh, J.
  • M.N. Venkatachaliah, C.J.
Show Solution

The Correct Option is B

Solution and Explanation

Indian law's ‘Absolute Liability’ concept originated with C.J. P.N. Bhagwati. This legal principle was created to address harm caused by dangerous industries. It represents a major advancement in Indian law, showing how the law needs to change with new socio-economic conditions from industrialization. This principle holds that companies doing risky activities are fully responsible for ensuring these activities are extremely safe. This approach differs from older liability ideas from foreign laws and highlights an independent development of Indian legal principles.

As stated in the M.C. Mehta v. Union of India case, the law has to adapt and create new principles to deal with issues from a highly industrialized economy, apart from current rules that don't acknowledge strict and absolute liability.
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Top Questions on Jurisprudence

Questions Asked in CLAT PG exam

An unpleasant tussle ensured between the TATA Sons and Cyrus Pallonji Mistry (“CPM”) in October 2016, when Mistry, who was the sixth chairman of Tata Sons, was ousted from the position of Executive Chairman of Tata Sons Limited. CPM took over as the chairman in 2012 after Ratan Tata announced his retirement. Tata Group patriarch Ratan Tata had personally asked Cyrus Mistry to resign as chairman of Tata Sons as the board had lost faith in him, but his refusal led to the removal via majority vote. Cyrus Investments Private limited and Sterling Investment Corporation Private Limited belonged to the Shapoorji Palloni Group in which CPM held a controlling interest (about 2% of the issued share capital of Tata Sons). Seven out of the nine directors of Tata Sons voted for CPM’s replacement after Farida Khambata abstained and Mistry was declared ineligible to vote as he was an interested director. Mistry challenged his removal, accusing the board of mismanagement and of oppressing minority shareholders. however, the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) rejected his petition. After this Mistry challenged his removal in National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). In 2018, NCLAT order restored Mistry as the group’s executive chairman. Tata Sons challenged that NCLAT order in Supreme Court. CPM also challenged the order for few more relief. Supreme Court stayed NCLAT’s order reinstating Cyrus Mistry as the executive chairman of Tata Sons and restoring his directorships in the holding company as well as three group companies, with a preliminary observation that the first impression of the order was “not good” and that the tribunal ‘could’ not have given consequential relief that had not been sought in the first place. Ultimately, the Supreme Court decided the case in favour of Tata Sons. One of the issues decided by Supreme Court was that “whether the case was fit to be qualified as a situation of ‘Oppression and Mismanagement’ under Section 241 of the Companies Act, 2013?”. On this issue, the Supreme Court observed that “unless the removal of a person as a chairman of a company is oppressive or mismanaged or done in a prejudicial manner damaging the interests of the company, its members or the public at large, the NCLT cannot interfere with the removal of a person as a Chairman of a Company in a petition under Section 241 of the Companies Act, 2013.” This case highlighted the point that “an executive chairman does not have sovereign authority over the company. In corporate democracy, decision making always remains with the Board as long as they enjoy the pleasure of the shareholders. Likewise, an executive chairman will continue as long as he/she enjoys the pleasure of the Board. An assumption by the executive chairman that he/she would have a free hand in running the affairs of the company is incongruous to corporate governance and corporate democracy. The Tribunal held that the concept of ‘free hand rule’ is antithesis to collective responsibility and collective decision making”.
[Based on Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. v. Cyrus Investment Pvt. Ltd., 2021 SCC 122].
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Alastair Hudson in his book ‘Securities Law’ First Edition (Sweet & Maxwell), 2008 at page 342, refers to ‘Restricted Offers’ and noticed that there is no contravention of Section 85 of FSMA 2000, if: “(b) the offer is made to or directed at fewer than 100 persons, other than qualified investors, per EEA State”. The purpose underlying that exemption, the author says, is mainly the fact that the offer is not being made to an appreciable section of “the public” such that the policy of the prospectus rules generally is not affected. Further, the author says that “Self-evidently, while an offer to 99 ordinary members of the public would be within the literal terms of the exemption, it would not be the sort of activity anticipated by the legislation. Moreover, if a marketing campaign were arranged such that ordinary members of the people were approached in groups of 99 people at a time in an effort to avoid the prospectus rules, then that would not appear to be within the spirit of the regulations and might be held to contravene the core principle that a regulated person must act with integrity.”
I may, therefore, indicate, subject to what has been stated above, in India that any share or debenture issue beyond forty-nine persons, would be a public issue attracting all the relevant provisions of the SEBI Act, regulations framed thereunder, the Companies Act, pertaining to the public issue. Facts clearly reveal that Saharas have issued securities to the public more than the threshold limit statutorily fixed under the first proviso to Section 67(3) and hence violated the listing provisions which may attract civil and criminal liabilities. Principles of listing, which I may later on discuss, is intended to assist public companies in identifying their obligations and responsibilities, which are continuing in nature, transparent in content and call for high degree of integrity. Obligations are imposed on the issuer on an ongoing basis. Public companies who are legally obliged to list their securities are deemed to accept the continuing obligations, by virtue of their application, prospectus and the subsequent maintenance of listing on a recognized stock exchange. Disclosure is the rule, there is no exception. Misleading public is a serious crime, which may attract civil and criminal liability. Listing of securities depends not upon one’s volition, but on statutory mandate.
[Extract from Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited v. Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), Para 89-91, Civil Appeal No. 9833/2011 (SC)]
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The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words, they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past, it was thought that it included just two rules namely: (1) no one shall be a judge in his own case (Nemo debet esse judex propria causa) and (2) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem).
Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice. Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is not questioned.
If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi-judicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry as observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala [Civil Appeal No. 990/68, decided on 15-07- 1968], the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case.
[Extract from the judgment of the Supreme Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262, decided on April 29, 1969, hereafter ‘A.K. Kraipak’].
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The doctrine of promissory estoppel is by now well recognized and well defined by a catena of decisions of this Court. Where the Government makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promise and, in fact, the promise, acting in reliance on it, alters his position, the Government would be held bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Government at the instance of the promise notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 229 of the Constitution. The rule of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine has to be moulded to suit the particular situation. It is not a hard-and-fast rule but an elastic one, the objective of which is to do justice between the parties and to extend an equitable treatment to them. This doctrine is a principle evolved by equity, to avoid injustice and though commonly named promissory estoppel, it is neither in the realm of contract nor in the realm of estoppel. For application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel the promise must establish that he suffered in detriment or altered his position by reliance on the promise.
Normally, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is being applied against the Government and defence based on executive necessity would not be accepted by the court. However, if it can be shown by the Government that having regard to the facts as they have subsequently transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government to the promise made by it, the court would not raise an equity in favour of the promise and enforce the promise against the Government. Where public interest warrants, the principles of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked. The Government can change the policy in public interest. However, it is well settled that taking cue from this doctrine, the authority cannot be compelled to do something which is not allowed by law or prohibited by law. There is no promissory estoppel against the settled proposition of law. Doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked for enforcement of a promise made contrary to law, because none can be compelled to act against the statute. Thus, the Government or public authority cannot be compelled to make a provision which is contrary to law.
[Extract from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shree Sidhbali Steels Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2011) 3 SCC 193, decided on January 20, 2011, hereafter ‘Shree Sidhbali Steels’].
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